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LUREY, EDWARD. The Role in Systematic Desensitization of the 
Reattribution of Causality Through Self-Observation. (1975) 
Directed by: Dr. P. Scott Lawrence. Pp. 129. 
It was hypothesized that one of the active and clini­
cally effective elements which was operational within a 
systematic desensitization paradigm involved an attributional 
reorganization. This reorganization would occur as a 
function of the subject observing himself on video tape 
behave in a non-fearful manner (as indicated by false heart 
rate feedback) toward a feared stimulus. The subject would 
then positively attribute to himself a series of dispositional 
traits involving adaptive coping skills. These skills would 
be demonstrated in each of the five dependent measures 
(Behavioral Avoidance Test, Fear Thermometer, Heart Rate, 
Physiological Perception Questionnaire, and S-R Inventory of 
Anxiousness) which were collected in pre and posttreatment 
assessments. The experimental design consisted of three 
different video conditions by two audio feedback conditions 
and a no-treatment control group. There were four sessions 
for each treatment group. After the first session (i.e., 
the second session through the posttest), subjects either 
saw themselves and the snake, a model and the snake, or the 
snake only on videotape. In addition, while reviewing video­
taped sessions, subjects either heard no audio feedback or 
what was purported to be their heart rate (false feedback) 
decreasing over sessions. 
The results of statistical multivariate and univariate 
analyses of variance indicated that the six experimental 
treatment groups and the no-treatment group demonstrated 
equal improvement on most dependent measures. Post hoc 
analyses indicated differential treatment effects only on the 
Behavioral Avoidance Test dependent measure. 
In an effort to explain why overall differential 
treatment effects were not found, major differences in the 
parameters between recent experimentation in cognitive 
therapies and this experiment were discussed. In addition, 
the results were discussed and interpreted as tentative 
support for an extinction hypothesis. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The writer wishes to thank Dr. P. Scott Lawrence for 
serving as dissertation adviser and Drs. Louis Karmel, 
Rosemery Nelson, Kendon Smith, and Michael Weiner for 
serving as committee members. 
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iii 
LIST OF TABLES vii 
LIST OF FIGURES x 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION 1 
Attribution 2 
False Physiological Feedback 4 
Cognitive Coping Treatment 8 
Covert Coping Treatment. . 11 
Divergence of Perception 13 
Recapitulation 29 
Hypothesis Investigated 30 
II. METHOD 32 
Subjects 32 
Pretreatment Assessment 32 
Dependent Measures 35 
Design Overview 36 
Treatment Groups and Procedures 38 
Experimental Group I (video-self, 
audio-false HR) 38 
Experimental Group II (video self, 
audio-no feedback) 42 
Experimental Group III (video-
model, audio-false HR) 42 
Experimental Group IV (video-model, 
audio-no feedback) 42 
Experimental Group V (video-snake, 
audio-false HR) 43 
Experimental Group VI (video-snake, 
audio-no feedback) 43 
Experimental Group VII (no 
treatment control) 43 
Posttreatment Assessment 44 
iv 
CHAPTER Page 
III. RESULTS 45 
Pretreatment Matching of Groups 45 
Subject Attrition 45 
A Note of Caution in the Inter­
pretation of the Statistical 
Results 48 
Analyses of Dependent Variable 
Scores Treated as Repeated 
Measures 48 
Computation of Difference Scores .... 51 
Analysis of Six Experimental 
Groups (Excluding the 
No-treatment Group) 51 
Analysis of Six Experimental 
Groups and No-treatment 
Group 54 
Analyses Relating to Borkovec's 
Hypotheses 59 
Analyses Based Upon Pretest 
Physiological Heart Rate 
Activity 59 
Analyses Based Upon Pretest 
Perception of Heart 
Rate Activity. . . 68 
Summary of Treatment Effects 70 
Postexperimental check on the 
Independent Manipulations 78 
IV. DISCUSSION 79 
Discussion of Primary Results 79 
Discussion of the Overall 
Pre-Post Improvements 80 
Discussion of Nonsignificant Results . . 82 
Discussion of BAT Results 83 
Discussion of Physiological 
Reactivity Results 84 
Summary 86 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 87 
APPENDICES 
A. General Screening Questionnaire 92 
v 
APPENDICES Page 
B. Participant Information Sheet 95 
C. Behavioral Avoidance Test 9 7 
D. Instructions Read to Subjects 100 
E. Personal Reactions Questionnaire 102 
F. Questionnaire on the Perception 
of Feeling 109 
G. Individual Data Sheet 114 
H. Subject Expectation Form. 116 
I. Instructions Read to Group II 118 
J. Instructions Read to Group III 120 
K. Instructions Read to Group IV 122 
L. Instructions Read to Group V 124 
M. Instructions Read to Group VI 126 
N. Postexperimental Questionnaire Checking 
the Subject's Belief in the 
Experimental Manipulations 128 
vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1 Treatment Groups as Designated by 
Independent Experimental Manipulations .... 37 
2 Overview of Treatment Sessions Indicating 
Feedback and Specified Subject Behaviors ... 39 
3 Multivariate Analysis of Variance on the 
Pretreatment Scores for Behavioral 
Avoidance Test (BAT), Fear Thermometer 
(FT) , and Heart Rate (HR) 46 
4 Analysis of Variance on Pretreatment 
Scores for Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT), 
Fear Thermometer (FT), and Heart Rate (HR) . . 47 
5 Summary Table on the Multivariate 
Analysis of Variance for the Five 
Dependent Measures Across Six Experimental 
Groups Treating the Pre- and Posttest 
Scores as Repeated Measures 49 
6 Summary Table on the Univariate Analyses 
of Variance for BAT, FT, HR, PPQ, and 
SRIA Scores for the Six Experimental 
Groups Treating the Pre and Posttest 
Scores as Repeated Measures 50 
7 Pre-Post and Difference Score Means 
for Each Experimental Group Across 
all Dependent Measures 52 
8 Multivariate Analyses of Variance 
on the Difference Scores for the Five 
Dependent Measures Across Six 
Experimental Treatment Groups 55 
9 Summary of Univariate Analyses of 
Variance for the Five Dependent 
Variable Difference Scores for the 
Six Experimental Treatment Groups 56 
10 Multivariate Analysis of Variance on the 
Difference Scores for the BAT, FT, HR 
PPQ, and SRIA Across All Groups 57 
vii 
Table Page 
11 Summary of Univariate Analyses of Variance 
for BAT, FT, HR, PPQ, and SRIA Difference 
Scores for All Experimental Groups and 
the No-treatment Group 58 
12 Newman-Keuls Comparison of Treatment 
Means for BAT Difference Scores 60 
13 Difference Score Means and Standard 
Deviations for All Experimental Subjects ... 61 
14 Mean Pretest Heart Rate Scores for 
Physiological Reactivity ANOVA 63 
15 Analysis of Variance on Pretest Heart 
Rate Scores for Subjects Designated 
as High, Medium and Low in 
Physiological Reactivity 64 
16 Multivariate Analysis of Variance on 
the Difference Scores for All 
Dependent Measures Across Subjects 
Grouped into Three Levels of Pretest 
Pulse Rate Activity 65 
17 Summary of Univariate Analyses of 
Variance for BAT, FT, HR, PPQ, and 
SRIA Difference Scores for Subjects 
Grouped into Three Levels of Pretest 
Pulse Rate Activity 66 
18 Newman-Keuls Comparison of Treatment 
Means for HR Difference Scores 67 
19 Mean Pretest Scores for the 
Summation of PPQ Heart Rate Item 
Numbers 9, 10, and 11 69 
20 Multivariate Analyses of Variance on 
the Difference Scores for All 
Dependent Measures Across Subjects 
Grouped into Three Levels of Pretest 
Heart Rate Perception 71 
viii 
Table Page 
21 Summary of Univariate Analyses of 
Variance for BAT, FT, HR, PPQ and SRIA 
Difference Scores for Subjects Grouped 
Into Three Levels of Pretest Heart 
Rate Perception 72 
22 Newman-Keuls Comparison of Treatment 
Means for PPQ Difference Scores 73 
23 Newman-Keuls Comparison of Treatment 
Means for SRIA Difference Scores 74 
24 Percent Improvement for Each Group 
Over the Five Dependent Measures 75 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1 Physical Lay-out of the Equipment 40 
2 Percent Improvement Demonstrated by Groups 
I, III, V (all Receiving False Heart Rate 
Feedback) and No Treatment Group (VII) on 
the Five Dependent Measures 76 
3 Percent Improvement Demonstrated by Groups 
II, IV, VI (not Receiving False Heart Rate 
Feedback) and No Treatment Group (VII) on 
the Five Dependent Measures 77 
x 
1 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Researchers in behavior therapy are currently interested 
in delineating the active elements influencing fear reduction 
in systematic desensitization (SD). In general, reviews of 
the literature in the area on human process studies (Bandura, 
1969; Davison & Wilson, 1973; Lang, 1969) and animal analogue 
research (Wilson & Davison, 1971) have provided evidence 
supporting an extinction hypothesis. In addition, Evans 
(1973), examining the logical structures of proposed 
alternate explanations of SD, concluded that the extinction 
hypothesis was the most logically viable of all considered 
alternatives. Although the weight of the evidence has 
supported an extinction hypothesis in SD, exploration of 
adjunct factors has continued. One procedure used to 
investigate these other hypothesized active elements has 
been the utilization of false physiological feedback. 
Investigators of false physiological feedback within 
SD have sought experimental evidence for the utility of this 
approach in modifying a subject's response to a fearful 
stimulus. The theory underlying the experimental paradigm 
common to these studies was derived from the social psycho­
logical framework of attribution theory (Davison & Wilson, 
1973). As the present study is also investigating the use 
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of false feedback and attribution within SD, the results of 
past experimentation in this area will be reviewed. 
Attribution 
The clinical analogue studies in which attribution was 
used as an explanatory concept were based upon theoretical 
concepts proposed by Schachter. Experiments by Schachter and 
his collegues (Nisbett & Schachter, 1966; Schachter & Singer, 
1962; Schachter & Wheeler, 1962) provided evidence to the 
effect that specific emotions reported by a person not only 
depend upon his internal state of physiological arousal but 
also on the way he cognitively interprets and labels this 
subjective state. A clinical extension from this theory was 
initiated by Valins and Ray (1967). 
Valins and Ray (1967) conducted two studies which 
utilized snake-fearful subjects. In both studies, Valins 
and Ray led experimental subjects to believe that they were 
listening to their own heart rates not reacting to snake 
stimuli (slides or in-vivo presentations of the snake). Con­
comitantly, the experimental subjects were supposed to believe 
that they were demonstrating a noticeable heart-rate reaction 
to the presentation of slides signaling a mild electric 
shock. The control subjects in both studies were to assume 
that the sounds heard throughout the experiment were extra­
neous, non related laboratory noises. Valins and Ray re­
ported that on post-test measures, experimental subjects 
demonstrated significantly greater approach behaviors toward 
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the snake than did control subjects. The experimenters hy­
pothesized that a cognitive reappraisal had occurred in that 
subjects attributed their lack of physiological responses to 
the cognition that they were really not frightened by snakes. 
Davison and Wilson (1973) indicated that experimental design 
problems in addition to questionable statistical manipula­
tions dispute the veridicality of the explanation offered by 
Valins and Ray. Even more damaging than the internal problems 
associated with the Valins and Ray study was the lack of 
experimental verification by other researchers. Kent, 
Wilson, and Nelson (1972) attempted to replicate the Valins 
and Ray study using the same stimuli and procedure as the 
original study. However, Kent et al. (1972) used more 
stringent and objective pre- and posttest measures. The 
results from the Kent et al. study indicated no significant 
changes in the experimental subjects' approach behaviors nor 
in their attitudes toward snakes. In conceptually similar 
studies, Sushinsky and Bootzin (1970), Rosen, Rosen, and 
Reid (1972), and Gaupp, Stern, and Galbraith (1972) all 
failed to produce evidence supporting the proposition that 
cognitive reattribution based upon false physiological feed­
back would result in significant covert (physiological and 
subjective feelings and thoughts) or overt (approach) changes 
in the subjects' fear responses. Wilson (1973) reported a 
modified replication of an experiment by Brown (1970), test­
ing the hypothesis that progress up the hierarchy in SD 
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results in a reduction of avoidance behavior. Although the 
Wilson (1973) study was not specifically investigating 
cognitive reattribution, the experimental paradigm was suffi­
ciently similar to cite his results as evidence in the 
appraisal of the utility of reattribution within SD. Wilson 
found that false feedback did produce a reduction in subjects' 
self-report of fear but failed to influence overt avoidance 
behavior. As other investigators (e.g., Gaupp et al., 
(197^); Kent et al. , (1972); Sushinsky & Bootzin, (1970) ) 
had not obtained similar results in modifying cognitive 
measures of fear, Wilson concluded there was little compelling 
experimental support for any strictly cognitive explanation 
of SD which, of course, includes reattribution. The pre­
ponderance of evidence reported by other investigators has 
placed the Valins and Ray (1967) attributional explanation 
in an empirically unsupported and theoretically tenuous 
position. 
False Physiological Feedback 
Fundamental to all of the studies cited thus far was 
the incorporation of false physiological feedback as the 
crucial independent experimental manipulation. Data have 
been reported indicating that in specific experimental 
circumstances, false feedback may be an important factor in 
maintaining a subject's fear response (Koenig & Del 
Castillo, 1969). A recent study by Koenig (1973) tested the 
maintenance or reduction of anxiety in test-anxious subjects 
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by manipulating the feedback indicating the magnitude of 
their autonomic activity. The results of this study 
supported the proposition that false feedback denoting low 
anxiety facilitated subject performance while feedback 
indicating high arousal led to decreased test performance. 
The obvious implication was that in certain circumstances a 
subject's overt performance can be affected by the cognitions 
that he is in a relaxed or aroused physiological state. 
Borkovec has also been most active in investigating the 
effects of physiological feedback on anxiety and fear re­
duction. In one study, Borkovec and Glasgow's (1973) 
objective was an effort to define the necessary conditions 
for replicating the Valins and Ray (1967) study. Their 
study was performed after three attempted replications 
(Gaupp et al., 1972; Kent et al., 1972; Sushinsky & Bootzin, 
1970) had failed to demonstrate any significant changes in 
the subject's approach behaviors. Borkovec and Glasgow (1973) 
demonstrated that false feedback could modify avoidance 
behavior as originally reported by Valins and Ray. However, 
their study indicated that this result was dependent upon 
(1) not pre-exposing subjects to the feared stimulus prior 
to false feedback and (2) a high demand posttest. As only 
those subjects who were not exposed to the feared stimulus 
demonstrated increased approach behaviors, Borkovec and 
Glasgow (1973) concluded that pre-exposure mitigated any 
influence false feedback might have on subsequent behavior. 
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In further pursuing this line of investigation, Borkovec 
(1973a) empirically demonstrated that suggestions for 
improvement and physiological cues had differential effects 
upon subjects who differed on the dimensions of strong versus 
weak physiological activity (pulse rate), and strong versus 
weak perception of physiological cues during the actual 
exposure to the feared stimulus. The results failed to 
indicate a significant effect of feedback on fearful 
behavior. However, the study did find that individual 
subject characteristics relating to the magnitude of arousal 
and the subjects' perception of arousal were significantly 
related to improvement and differentially affected by the 
bogus feedback. Borkovec (1973a) further stated that the 
"absence of internal cues, as defined by low pulse rate 
reaction to pre-test instructions was related to greater 
approach change . . ." (Borkovec, 1973a, p. 190). The most 
recent study published by Borkovec was designed to assess 
the effects of false feedback during actual exposure and also 
during subsequent exposures to a fear stimulus. For this 
study Borkovec, Wall, and Stone (1974) utilized speech-
anxious subjects. It was predicted that 
. . . there would be no differential feedback 
effects during the second (feedback) speech but 
that the decrease conditions and no-change 
conditions would result in significantly less 
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fear on the third speech than the increase 
condition (Borkovec et al., 1974, p. 165). 
The results confirmed the findings for Borkovec1s (1973a) 
study, as data were reported indicating that false feedback 
had no effect during its presentation. However, subjects 
who had received bogus heart-rate decreases or no-change 
information demonstrated significantly less fear on the 
third speech than subjects who believed their heart rates 
increased. The data from Borkovec's studies are congruent 
with two corollary hypotheses offered in Borkovec's (1973b) 
review of the literature on physiological feedback in fear 
research. In his review, Borkovec proposed that: 
(a) external demand cue manipulation will affect 
fear behavior to the extent that actual, internal 
physiological cues are absent. Subjects for whom 
the physiological component is very strong will 
be little affected by demand cues suggesting 
improvement; physiological cues will maintain 
fear behavior until such cues and/or their 
functional relationships with subsequent behaviors 
are changed. (b) Actual physiological cue 
manipulation will reduce (or maintain) fear 
behavior in the presence of external demand cues 
discriminative for non-fear (or fear) behavior 
(Borkovec, 1973b, p. 499). 
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In summarizing the evidence presented thus far, it is 
apparent that the overwhelming weight of accumulated experi­
mental evidence is contrary to the Valins and Ray (1967) 
attribution hypothesis. On the other hand, results of 
studies investigating false physiological feedback have 
yielded data supporting this approach in modifying certain 
fears and anxieties. Although the data from false feedback 
studies cannot be accepted as direct support for a cognitive 
reattribution hypothesis, the data do sustain the logical 
inference that some restructuring may be occurring within 
the subject for bogus feedback to result in increased 
approach behavior. 
In an effort to explain the possible intervening 
cognitive process which occurs between perception of feed­
back and subsequent changes in approach (motor) behavior, an 
attributional explanation will be hypothesized. However, 
prior to the eludication of the specific hypothesis under 
experimental investigation, there are two areas of investi­
gation of interest to behavior modifiers which are germane to 
the theoretical rationale of this study. These two pro­
cedures are Meichenbaum's (1973, 1974) cognitive training 
technique and Kazdin's (1974a, 1974b, 1974c) covert modeling 
procedure. 
Cognitive Coping Treatment 
A skills-oriented treatment procedure has been 
developed by Meichenbaum (1973) which he terms "stress 
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inoculation training." His treatment approach was based 
upon earlier empirical studies (Meichenbaum, Gilmore & 
Fedoravicius, 1971; Meichenbaum & Goodman, 1971) which 
demonstrated the efficacy of self-statements as potential 
modifiers of behavior. (As Meichenbaum's technique is 
considered a variation of the standard systematic desen-
sitization paradigm Davison and Wilson QL973] address them­
selves to this approach in their critical review on 
cognitively oriented SD alterations. It seems most 
significant to reiterate Davison and Wilson's conclusion 
that, in their opinion, only Meichenbaum's cognitively 
oriented approach demonstrated sufficient evidence to 
warrant further experimentation and consideration.) In 
essence, Meichenbaum's technique was designed to accomplish 
the following goals. 
It attempts (1) to modify the client's appraisal 
of the fearful situation and of his ability to 
cope; (2) to teach the client specific skills, 
and (3) to provide him with an opportunity for 
application of training. The skills-training 
treatment approach was designed to translate the 
client's sense of "learned helplessness" into a 
feeling of "learned resourcefulness" so that he 
could cope with any stress-inducing situation 
(Meichenbaum, 1974, p. 16). 
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In general, Meichenbaum specified a process which was 
designed to endow the client with the belief that he (the 
client) had the requisite skills to interact with the feared 
stimulus or situation in an adaptive manner. Meichenbaum's 
process differed from the traditional SD approach in "how" 
the client visualized himself interacting with the feared 
stimulus. In traditionally practiced SD, the client was 
requested to visualize himself interacting with the stimulus 
at low levels of subjective anxiety thereby demonstrating 
"mastery" of the task. In Meichenbaum's technique, the 
client was led into the hierarchy item with feelings of fear 
and was subsequently led through a series of statements in 
which he effectively "copes" with the perceived subjective 
anxiety. (E.g., "This anxiety is what the doctor said you 
would feel. It's a reminder to use your coping 
exercises" (Meichenbaum, 197^) Meichenbaum has concluded 
that: 
Comparisons between skills-training procedures 
and standard behavior therapies have indicated 
that greater therapeutic benefit, broader 
application of behavior change, and longer 
persistence of behavior improvement result 
from skills-training treatment programs 
(Meichenbaum, 1974, p. 16). 
Empirical verification of Meichenbaum's coping skills 
technique has not been limited to those studies which retain 
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his name as author. Kazdin (1974a, 1974b, 1974c), utilizing 
covert desensitization procedures, has reported greater 
treatment effectiveness in support of a coping approach 
versus a mastery approach. 
Covert Coping Treatment 
Kazdin's research was based upon Cautela's (1971) 
proposal that observational learning (modeling) could be 
effectively executed by requesting that the client imagine 
the model (covertly) rather than utilize a live or filmed 
model. Recently, Cautela, Flannery, and Hanley (1974) have 
demonstrated that covert and overt modeling are equivalent 
in reducing avoidance behavior. Additional evidence 
supporting the efficacy of covert modeling has been pre­
sented by Kazdin. Kazdin's studies have indicated that 
covert modeling was effective in developing assertiveness 
(Kazdin, 1974b) and also in reducing avoidance behavior 
(Kazdin, 1973, 1974a, 1974c). In one study, Kazdin (1974a) 
manipulated two variables: the similarity of the imagined 
model to the subject (similar versus dissimilar) and the 
method by which the subject imagined himself interacting with 
the feared stimulus (coping versus mastery). The results 
indicated that subjects who were instructed to imagine a 
model similar in age and sex performed significantly better 
than those subjects who imagined a model interacting with 
the feared stimulus who was older and oppositely sexed. 
Although the results did not indicate statistical significance 
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in support of the coping manipulation, the general results 
indicated greater improvement for coping subjects than 
mastery subjects. By far, the most improved group examined 
across all dependent measures was the similar-coping group. 
This result is consonant with the experimental literature, 
which has supported the proposition that the greater the 
similarity between the model and observer, the greater the 
modeling effect (Rachman, 1972). Kazdin's (1974c) next 
experiment manipulated subjects covertly imagining them­
selves (self) or someone else similar in age and sex (other) 
in a series of scenes with a feared stimulus. In this study, 
Kazdin also instructed subjects to visualize the assigned 
model demonstrating behaviors indicative of mastery or of 
coping with the feared stimulus. The results indicated that 
a coping technique was significantly more effective in 
improving approach behaviors than the mastery technique. 
However, there was no statistical difference between those 
subjects who imagined themselves coping (self-coping) and 
the group who imagined someone of similar age and sex coping 
(other-coping). The rationale for this particular study 
(Kazdin, 1974c) was based upon his observation that 
Covert modeling bears conspicuous resemblance to 
imaginal systematic desensitization. Indeed, 
desensitization may be construed as self- model­
ing where the client imagines himself performing 
behaviors he would normally avoid. (An argument 
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could also be made for a self-modeling inter­
pretation of in vivo desensitization where a 
subject observes his own performance and draws 
inferences on the basis of consequences which 
follow his behavior (C.F. Bern, 1967) (Kazdin, 
1974c, p. 625). 
The different inferences which a subject makes based 
upon his behavioral observations of self versus others was 
considered important by two other theoreticians, Jones and 
Nisbett (1971). 
Divergence of Perception 
There is a pervasive tendency for actors to 
attribute their actions to situational 
requirements, whereas observers tend to 
attribute the same actions to stable personal 
dispositions (Jones & Nisbett, 1971, p. 2). 
Data from experimental studies yield confirming 
evidence to the hypothesis of divergent attributions among 
actors and observers. Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, and 
Ward (1968) demonstrated this effect, utilizing a rigged 
I.Q.-testing situation. Each subject, paired with an 
accomplice, answered 30 questions. The questions were of 
sufficient difficulty so that correctness of the answers was 
not discernible. The feedback to the subjects in all 
conditions was manipulated so that they believed they had 
correctly solved ten of the 30 questions. The subject's 
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correct responses were evenly scattered throughout the test. 
The experimental manipulation assigned 15 correct answers to 
the accomplice, randomly, at the beginning, or at the end of 
the test. In the first condition, the accomplice solved 15 
items uniformly scattered among the 30 items. In the second 
condition, the accomplice solved most of the problems in the 
first half, and in the last condition, the majority of correct 
answers were given toward the end of the test. The results 
from a post-experimental questionnaire indicated that the 
manipulation had a strong effect upon the subject's judge­
ment of the accomplice's ability on another I.Q. test. 
Accomplices who solved a larger proportion of the questions 
at the beginning of the test (descending condition) , were 
perceived by the subjects to be the most intelligent, per­
ceived their overall performance in a more favorable manner, 
and predicted an even better result on future tests. The 
subject's perception of accomplices in the ascending 
condition (most problems solved late in the series) was 
least favorable. They were perceived as not having the 
magnitude of positive abilities or dispositional charac­
teristics which would warrant expectations of success on 
future tests. The uniformly scattered condition fell mid­
way between the descending and ascending manipulations. 
The results of the first part of the study were un­
equivocally reversed when the accomplices randomly solved 
ten problems and the subjects solved fifteen in either 
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ascending, descending or random order. Subjects who 
correctly answered more problems at the end of the series 
(ascending condition) were quite willing to attribute their 
success to a situational determinant, the fact that test 
items were easier toward the end. Those subjects in the 
descending condition viewed the test items as becoming in­
creasingly more difficult, despite the experimenter's state­
ment that all questions were of equal difficulty. The 
descending subjects firmly held the belief that there was a 
change in the level of item difficulty. The experimental 
manipulation also affected subjects' predictions of achieve­
ment on future series. Subjects who performed better at the 
end (ascending) predicted greater success for themselves 
than those in the descending condition. This was a direct 
reversal of what subjects had predicted in the observation 
of a successful accomplice. Although subjects were most 
willing to judge the mental abilities of the accomplices, 
judgements about their own intellectual capacities were un­
affected by the experimental manipulations. In summary: 
The pattern of attributions is therefore quite 
different for actor and observer. In identical 
situations, the actor attributes performance to 
variations in task difficulty, the observer to 
variations in ability (Jones & Nisbett, 1971, p. 3). 
There are studies indicating observers will maintain a 
dispositional attitude toward another person even under 
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circumstances in which the person's behavior is being 
directed by obvious situational determinants. Jones and 
Harris (1967) performed three experiments which were varia­
tions upon a common theme. In each of the studies, subjects 
listened to or read essays purported to be another student's 
work. In different conditions, subjects were informed that 
the communication was based upon a mandatory requirement or 
performed as a personal expression of attitude. The results 
indicated that the situational constraints had no effect on 
the observer's estimates of the true opinions of the 
communicator. For example, subjects who listened to a 
speech supporting Castro's Cuba inferred that the communicator 
held a positive personal attitude toward Castro even when 
they were informed that the position communicated was fulfil­
ling a course requirement. The inference of attitude in the 
anti-Castro message also indicated an attribution of what was 
believed to be the subject's true feeling. The observer's 
inference of attitudes in the free-choice condition was 
essentially in the same direction as the mandatory condition 
but of much greater magnitude. The importance of these 
results is not in the strength of the effect, but in the fact 
that the same attribution of personal attitude occurred in 
both choice and no-choice situations. The results seem to 
indicate that observers tend to disregard, to a large extent, 
the situational demands involved and most readily ascribe 
dispositional attitudes on the part of the communicator. In 
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a similar study, these results were replicated using the 
legalization of marijuana as the issue (Jones, Worchel, 
Goethals, & Grumet, 1971). 
Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, and Marecek (1973) report a 
series of three experiments on a differing perceptual 
phenomenon. In the first study two sets of subjects were 
utilized. One set of subjects, designated as actors, were 
led to believe that they would be participating in a study 
on decision making. The other set (observers) were told 
that they were to observe the subjects (actors) and would be 
responsible for making judgements about the actors' reasons 
for making a particular decision. As part of the experiment, 
the experimenter stated that prior to beginning the study, 
he had a request for volunteers to perform as campus guides 
on the weekend. The experimenter first asked a confederate, 
taking part in the study, if he would volunteer. The confed­
erate always complied with the request. The subject was 
then asked if he would agree to volunteer. The independent 
experimental manipulation consisted of offering $.50 per 
hour or $1.50 per hour in the request-for-volunteers1 speech. 
The results revealed that 20% of the low pay subjects 
volunteered, and 66% of the high-pay subjects complied with 
the request. At that point, the actor and observer were led 
to separate rooms and were both questioned about the actor's 
motives for volunteering. The data indicated that observers 
of volunteering subjects, in both high and low pay 
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conditions, believed that those subjects would be predisposed 
to volunteer for another cause in the future. Most of the 
observers tended to believe that the observation of a 
volunteering subject indicated personal traits which would 
result in high probabilities of similar behaviors. The 
volunteering actors, themselves, did not agree. The majority 
of the compliant actors did not believe that they were any 
more likely to help another cause than those actors who had 
not volunteered. The actors were appraising their current 
as well as future behavior in terms of the situational 
demands rather than attributing their volunteering to 
personality predispositions. This study adds evidence to the 
premise that observers are inclined to infer stable person­
ality traits while actors are not. 
Attribution of personality traits by observers has 
also been demonstrated using paper and pencil question­
naires. McArthur (1972) manipulated various levels of 
consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information in a 
series of statements read by her subjects. After reading a 
series of response statements, subjects were requested to 
attribute those statements to characteristics of the person 
(actor), the stimulus, the cirexamstance, or to some combina­
tion of the three factors. McArthur asks: 
. . . why are mundane events such as "Sue is 
afraid of the dog," "George translates the 
sentence incorrectly," "Ralph trips over Joan's 
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feet while dancing," and "Steve puts a bumper 
sticker advocating improved auto safety on his 
car" overwhelmingly attributed to characteristics 
of Sue, George, Ralph, and Steve (a total of 35 
person attributions) rather than to the ferocity 
of the dog, the difficulty of the sentence, the 
clumsiness of Joan, or the attractiveness of the 
bumper sticker (a total of three stimulus 
attributions)? One is hard pressed to come up 
with any logical explanation of this proclivity 
for person attribution. Certainly the real-
world incidence of fearful people, dumb people, 
clumsy Ralphs, and bumper sticker buffs does not 
exceed the incidence of ferocious dogs, difficult 
sentences, clumsy Joans, and beautiful bumper 
stickers (McArthur, p. 177)! 
Although the main purpose of the experiment was to delineate 
the different effects information and verb category have on 
causal attribution, McArthur did report data relevant to the 
divergence of perception hypothesis. McArthur (1972) found 
that subjects assigned only 4% of the total statements to 
pure stimulus attributions or to mixed stimulus-circumstance 
attributions. By far the largest proportion of attributed 
causes, 44%, were indicated as pure person attributions. 
Thus, she states: 
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One can only conclude that there exists a 
bias in favor of attributing behavior to 
characteristics of the person rather than 
to the stimulus properties of his environ­
ment (McArthur, 1972, p. 177). 
Along the same lines as McArthur's (1972) study, 
Cohen (1969) presented his subjects with a list of 64 state­
ments representing responses made by other persons. The 
subject's task was to divide up a total of 10 causal points 
between three possible loci, the person, the stimulus, or 
the circumstance. The results of his study also indicated 
that person attributions were given significantly greater 
weightings than stimulus properties. 
Using a different experimental tactic, Nisbett et al. 
(1973) asked subjects to write brief paragraphs stating why 
they had chosen their major field of academic concentration 
and why they liked the girl they most frequently dated. The 
subjects were then requested to write similar paragraphs 
explaining why their best friend had chosen his major and 
why the friend dated a particular girl. The sentences used 
by the subjects were coded into either stimulus attributions 
(e.g., "Psychology is a high-paying field," "She is a very 
warm person"), or person attributions ("I want to make a lot 
of money," "I like warm girls"). Data analysis revealed that 
subjects listed approximately the same number of stimulus 
and person reasons for choosing their major and twice as 
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many stimulus as person reasons for choosing their girl 
friend. However, when answering for his best friend, the 
subject listed approximately three times as many person 
versus stimulus reasons for choosing his major and roughly 
the same number of stimulus as person reasons for the 
choice in girl friends. In essence, subjects displayed a 
relative propensity for using dispositional language in 
describing their best friend's behavior and not for them­
selves . 
The final study summarized tested directly the 
divergence of perception hypothesis. Storms' (1973) experi­
mentally tested actor versus observer attributions utilizing 
videotapes of a brief, unstructured conversation between two 
subjects. The experimental design included two subjects, 
designated as actors, who engaged in a getting-acquainted 
conversation and two additional subjects (observers) who 
were instructed to watch the conversation but not to partic­
ipate in it. The actors and observers were placed across 
the table from each other so that each actor faced the other 
actor and each observer was oriented toward one of the 
actors. The independent experimental manipulation occurred 
in the replay of the conversation between the actors. The 
video cameras were placed so that in the video playback each 
actor would either see himself in the conversation (actor -
new orientation) or the other actor (actor - same orientation). 
The observers also saw replays of either the same actor they 
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had been assigned to observe (observer - same orientation) 
or the other actor (observer - new orientation). In addition 
to these conditions, another set of actors and observers did 
not see a video replay. The dependent measure was a post-
experimental questionnaire designed to determine to what 
extent actors and observers attributed situational or dis­
positional behavioral causes to the actors. It was hypothe­
sized that those actors and observers who saw the videotape 
duplicating their original visual perspective would not 
change their causal attributions. On the other hand, those 
subjects who saw replays from the opposite orientation would 
change. The results indicated that actors and observers in 
the no-tape and same-orientation cells indicated no signifi­
cant shifts in attributions. In these two conditions, actors 
remained situational in attributions while observers main­
tained a dispositional position. As it was anticipated that 
actors who saw videotapes of themselves would become more 
dispositional in causal attributions and that observers view­
ing videotapes of the other participant would become more 
situational, a role X videotape orientation interaction 
subjected to the appropriate statistical test. This inter­
action was highly significant indicating a complete reversal 
of causality for both actor and observer in the new-orienta­
tion condition. Storms (1973), in discussing the results, 
states: 
\ 
I 
I 
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The pr {.sent study demonstrates that visual 
orient ition has a powerful influence on the 
inferences made by actors and observers about 
the caiises of the actor's behavior. When video-i 
tape v;as not presented and subjects were left 
to assijae their own orientations, or when video­
tape reproduced subjects' original orientations, 
actors*attributed their behavior relatively more 
to situational causes than did observers. 
. . . but under conditions of reorientation, 
when /.ubjects saw a new point of view on video­
tape the attributional differences between 
acto? i and observers were exactly reversed. Re­
oriented, self-viewing actors attributed their 
behariors relatively less to situational causes 
than did observers (Storms, 1973, p. 171). 
It is the opinion of the present writer that sufficient 
experiment.il evidence exists to warrant a belief in the 
divergent perception hypothesis. However, for a compre­
hensive understnading of the attributional process, it is 
necessary to consider why this empirically demonstrated 
phenomenon occurs. 
Jones and Nisbett (1971) have examined the data and 
have proposed a few viable alternatives to explain the 
divergent perception phenomena. They propose that the 
divergence occurs within three distinct areas for actors and 
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observers. The first is cause-and-effect data; the second, 
historical data available to actors and observers; and the 
third (and most controversial area) involves hypothetical 
conceptualizations utilized in the processing of the 
available data. 
With respect to the effect data, both the actor and the 
observer can possess equivalent data concerning the (1) 
nature of the act (specifically what behavior was carried 
out) and the (2) environmental outcome (positive or negative 
consequences of the behavior). The actor and observer 
possibly diverge on the third effect, (3) the experimental 
(emotional) accompaniments of the behavior. The observer 
must infer from subtle or perhaps not so subtle cues on the 
actor's part what emotion the latter is experiencing; or 
perhaps the observer relies upon self-knowledge of how he 
would have felt under similar circumstances. The data result­
ing from inner effects is, of course, most subject to in­
correct inferences. 
Considering causal data, both actor and observer 
supposedly have equal knowledge concerning (1) the proximal 
environmental stimuli operating upon the actor. Theoretical­
ly, this knowledge is equivalent. However, from a practical, 
realistic standpoint, the actor and observer may only 
approach this equality. For example, should an actor be 
subjected to a series of degrading remarks from an experi­
menter at one time (T^) and again receive a series of milder 
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insults at another time (T£), an observer at T£ may erroneously 
misattribute the cause of the actor's outburst toward the 
experimenter at T2 . Furthermore, causal data jrelating to the 
(2) actor's intentions, may be quite divergent from what the 
observer infers to be the actor's true motivation. Just as 
the effect a situation may have on the actor's experiential 
state can never be directly known, the intentional cause can 
only be approximated by vicarious introspection. 
It seems apparent that much of the discrepancy and 
error in actor-observer attributions is due to ideographic 
differences which are based upon an individual's past 
history. The observers of others' behavior possess three 
different kinds of information: (1) consensus information -
do other actors behave in the same way to a given stimulus? 
(2) distinctiveness information - does the actor and do other 
actors behave in the same way to other stimuli? and (3) 
consistency information - does the actor and do other actors 
behave in the same way to the given stimulus across time and 
situational contexts? According to Kelly (1973), when the 
observer fills in the corresponding three-dimensional cube 
he will always lack some of the distinctiveness and consis­
tency information that the actor possesses by virtue of the 
actor's knowing his own history. Thus the observer is 
frequently diverted into dispositional generalities for 
explaining others' behavior in specific situations. 
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Conversely, what may be considered by an observer to be a 
typical sample of the actor's behavior may in fact be 
extremely atypical from the actor's view and specifically 
linked to situational determinants. In essence, the observer 
is forced into utilizing a small sample of behavior as 
complete data to make characteristically ideographic judge­
ments. On the other hand, the actor, knowing himself as no 
one else possibly can, has more precise and complete infor­
mation to which he may attribute his behavior. 
The last conceptualization which may be used to 
explain divergence of perception is one involving differential 
information processing by actors and observers. Jones and 
Nisbett (1971) state: 
We believe that important information-
processing differences do exist for the basic 
reason that different aspects of the available 
information are salient for actors and 
observers and this differential salience 
affects the course and outcome of the 
attribution process (Jones & Nisbett, 1971, p. 7). 
The stress upon differential information processing is 
based upon a strong Gestalt orientation. It may be assumed 
that all actions or behaviors occur within a situational or 
environmental context. From an observer's point of view, 
the action occurring is dynamic and in a constant state of 
change from one moment to the next, while the contextual 
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setting (once set) remains static. Thus, while the observer 
focuses upon the nuances of figural activity (the actor), 
the actor is most likely to direct his attention outward 
toward the subtle cues and discriminative stimuli to which 
he is responding (the situation). Parenthetically, it may 
also be pointed out that the actor's visual receptors are 
poorly located for recording the nuances of his own 
behavior. Therefore, the differential foci of attention as 
between actors and observers could result in differences of 
causal perception. The actor may regard his behavior to be 
primarily contingent upon environmental cues to which he 
must respond. On the other hand, the observer's primary 
stimulus is the actor's behavior as seen against a situational 
ground. The observer, in focusing on the actor's responses, 
would likely account for his observations in terms of 
attributed dispositions. 
In addition to different causal attributions based 
upon Gestalt organizations, there is another effect of 
perception upon the attribution process. This other 
perceptual difference is based upon a distinction between 
the primary versus secondary or evaluative qualities 
intrinsic to a stumulus. Jones and Nisbett (1971) 
accurately point out that even as adults we maintain beliefs 
in stimulus properties based upon their assumed primary 
qualities rather than a subjective evaluation of them. For 
example, most children as well as many adults believe that 
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clowns are funny in the same way that balls are round; 
funniness is experienced as a property of the clown. The 
fact that we rarely separate the belief that the beauty of 
a rose is a secondary evaluation and not a primary quality 
of the stimulus is a common error made in many of the 
evaluations people perform everyday. This failure to 
perceive the true dichotomy between intrinsic and evaluative 
qualities most certainly effects an actor's and observer's 
attributions in similar yet distinctly different ways. This 
lack of evaluation seems to allow the actor to experience 
attractions, repulsions, and restraints from what the actor 
believes to be the primary qualities of the stimulus to 
which he is responding. However, the identical stimuli 
impinging upon the actor are probably not salient to the 
observer. The observer, focusing upon the actor's behavior, 
may easily assume those behaviors to be the primary quality 
and the subsequent actions to be a reflection of dispositions 
or inherent qualities of the actor. To the extent that most 
people believe in and are imbued with this bias of perceptual 
observation, the actor will over-attribute his behavior to 
environmental stimuli (the situation) while observers will 
over-attribute the observed behavior to qualities of the actor 
(his trait dispositions). 
In summary, the observer and the actor are likely 
to take different perspectives toward the same 
information. For the observer, the actor's behavior 
is the figural stimulus against the ground of the 
situation. The actor's attention is focused out­
ward on his own behavior, and moreover, those 
situational cues are endowed with intrinsic 
properties that are seen to cause the actor's 
behavior toward them. Thus, for the observer the 
proximal cause of action is the actor; for the 
actor the proximal cause lies in the compelling 
qualities of the environment. Finally, the 
tendency for the observer to attribute action to 
the actor is probably increased to the extent that 
the observer is also an actor and to the extent 
that both the observing and the observed actor are 
tied together in a mutually contingent interaction 
(Jones & Nisbett, 1971, p. 10). 
Recapitulation 
At this juncture the following hypotheses have been 
shown to receive a degree of empirical support through experi­
mentation: 
1. False physiological feedback may under certain 
experimental circumstances lead to modification of fear, as 
evidenced by increased approach toward the feared stimulus. 
2. Comparisons between a coping versus a mastery 
approach have indicated the greater efficacy of teaching 
coping skills. 
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3. Subjects can utilize coping skills covertly, and 
the covertly imagined model that is similar to the subject 
produces the most positive results. 
4. There appears to be a general, pervasive tendency 
for observers to ascribe trait qualities and dispositions to 
observed models (actors). The results summarized in the 
above four points led to the following propositions. 
Hypothesis Investigated 
It was proposed that one of the active and effective 
elements which may be operational within a systematic de-
sensitization paradigm involves an attributional reorgani­
zation. This reorganization would occur as a function of 
the person observing himself (through imagery) behaving in 
an adaptive or nonfearful manner toward a feared stimulus. 
The resulting positive attributions to the observed model 
(actually himself) would be coded and assimilated as a 
series of dispositional traits involving adaptive coping 
skills. The subject believing that he possesses the 
necessary trait skills to interact adaptively with the 
feared stimulus would demonstrate decreased avoidance. In 
an effort to empirically substantiate that a reattribution 
of adaptive traits occurs within desensitization paradigm, 
the following hypothesis was tested. 
It was hypothesized that those subjects who observed 
themselves on videotaping reacting nonfearfully (as indicated 
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by false physiological feedback) in the presence of a feared 
stimulus would regard themselves as possessing the positive 
skills observed in the video-model (themselves). The result­
ing reattributions of coping traits would be demonstrated in 
decreased fear responses in all dependent measures. 
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Subjects 
A preliminary screening questionnaire (see Appendix A) 
was administered to approximately 1,000 undergraduate students 
enrolled in introductory psychology at the University of 
North Carolina-Greensboro. The fear-survey questionnaire 
was one of many psychological tests issued in a mass test­
ing program at the beginning of the semester. Students who 
rated a four or a five ( one = not at all afraid, five = very 
much afraid) to the question asking to what degree they 
feared snakes were selected for further testing. Two 
hundred and thirty-seven female students rated their fear at 
four or five. Each of these students was contacted by phone 
or by personal visit and was requested to undergo a pre-
treatment assessment. Two hundred and twelve students were 
evaluated in the pretreatment for which 47 demonstrated 
sufficient fear to be utilized as subjects. From the forty-
seven, forty-two subjects were randomly chosen to participate 
in the study ( 6 subjects per cell). 
Pretreatment Assessment 
Prior to administration of the behavioral avoidance 
test (BAT), subjects were requested to read a short 
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paragraph stating basic factual information on the char­
acteristics of reptiles (see Appendix B). Subjects were 
also given verbal instructions in how to properly handle 
reptiles. Bernstein and Paul (1971) have reported that 
subjects who are given this information demonstrate higher 
probabilities in handling snakes than subjects who have not 
received this type of communication. Therefore, this 
information was presented in an effort to exclude moderate 
and low fearful subjects who might have demonstrated 
avoidance on the BAT primarily due to misinformation and 
unfamilarity with the feared stimulus. 
Subjects were escorted individually into the experi­
mental testing room and seated at the end of a 9 foot 
pulley track. Three physiological monitoring devices 
(electrodes) were attached, one clip to each ear and the 
third to the subject's left wrist. While these electrodes 
were being attached, the experimenter explained that the 
purpose of the electrodes was to accurately record the heart 
rate (HR). The leads were connected to a polygraph (Grass 
Instrument Model #7) which was used to measure the subject's 
heart rate. The subjects were advised to sit quietly for 
a two-minute period to allow themselves to adapt to the 
novel situation. 
The high demand for approach BAT (see Appendix C), 
was initiated by the experimenter who read prepared instruc­
tions (see Appendix D) . The subjects were also advised 
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that they would not be forced to perform any behavior to 
which they strongly objected. The necessity and extreme 
importance of their full cooperation was stressed in order 
to determine how closely they could follow instructions 
in allowing a nonpoisonous 4 foot boa constrictor approach 
them. As specified on the BAT, the first ten items 
designated the distance between the seated subject and the 
boa housed in a plexiglass cage. The snake was located 
at the maximum distance (9 feet) from the subject at the 
end of the pulley track. The electronically activated 
pulley track was a modified Levis phobic test apparatus 
(1969) which advanced the snake toward the subject in one-
foot increments. Prior to activating the switch which 
decreased the linear distance between the subjects and the 
snake, the subjects were requested to specify how much fear 
they subjectively felt at the time. They were informed that 
the range of this scale (fear thermometer) was from "zero = 
no fear" to "ten = terrified." If the subject failed to 
perform the BAT item upon the first request, a five second 
latency was allowed to occur. At that time the experimenter 
advised the subject that it was "extremely important for you 
to proceed and please cooperate by . . . (the BAT item was 
repeated)." High demand upon the subject to perform the 
requested behavior was believed to eliminate those subjects 
who were not terrified of reptiles (Bernstein & Paul, 1971). 
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The subjects who failed to complete item 15 (touching 
the snake with bare hand on top of head) or any lesser item 
were believed to be sufficiently fearful to remain as 
experimental subjects. These subjects were escorted to an 
adjoining room and given two additional paper-and-pencil 
questionnaires; the S-R Inventory of Anxiousness (SRIA) 
(Endler, Hunt & Rosenstein, 1962; see Appendix E) and a 
modified form of Mandler, Mandler, and Uviller's (1958) 
autonomic perception questionnaire as altered and utilized 
by Borkovec (1973; see Appendix F). 
Dependent Measures 
The data from previous research imply that human 
behavior involves a set of separate but interacting response 
systems. Typically there are low correlations between those 
systems composing the triple response modes, verbal, motor, 
and physiological (Lang, 1968). Therefore, multiple 
dependent measures were indicated for pre-post test 
comparisons. In addition, the recent research by Borkovec 
(1973a, 1973b) demonstrated that subject characteristics of 
perceived and actual arousal were related to improvement. 
In an effort to test Borkovec1s hypotheses, a physiological 
perception questionnaire was included. The following 
dependent measures were given as pre-post test assessments: 
1. Behavioral avoidance test (BAT) - Motor Behavioral mode 
2. Fear Thermometer (FT) - Verbal-cognitive Behavioral mode 
3. Heart Rate (HR) - Physiological Behavioral mode 
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4. S-R Inventory of Anxiousness (SRIA) - Verbal-cognitive 
Behavioral mode 
5. Borkovec's Physiological Perception Questionnaire (PPQ) -
Verbal-cognitive/physiological Behavioral mode 
Design Overview 
Pre-tested subjects who failed item 15 or less on the 
BAT were matched into groups with respect to the behavioral 
avoidance measure (BAT), heart rate measure (HR), and the 
subjective fear measure (FT), such that all group means and 
standard deviations were homogeneous. 
The experimental groups were designated as follows 
(see Table 1): 
I. View self - out of focus video feedback - false audio 
HR feedback 
II. View self - out of focus video feedback - no audio 
feedback 
III. View model - out of focus video feedback - false audio 
HR feedback 
IV. View model - out of focus video feedback - no audio 
feedback 
V. View video feedback of snake only - false audio HR 
feedback 
VI. View video feedback of snake only - no audio feedback 
VII. No treatment control 
After the pre-test, each of the experimental groups, 
with the exception of group VII, the no treatment controls, 
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TABLE 1 
TREATMENT GROUPS AS DESIGNATED BY INDEPENDENT 
EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS 
Subject and 
snake 
Model and 
snake 
Snake 
only 
No treatment 
control 
False audio 
feedback 
Group I Group III Group V 
Group VII 
No audio 
feedback 
Group II Group IV Group VI 
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proceeded through the following sequence of sessions. (See 
Table 2.) 
The subject, T.V. camera and snake were located in 
the linear set up as shown in Figure 1. 
Treatment Groups and Procedures 
Experimental Group I (video-self, audio-false HR) 
Following the pre-test, each subject arranged a 
convenient time to report for his treatment sessions. Upon 
arrival for the first treatment session, the subject was 
read the following instructions: 
The treatment design in which you are participating 
has been demonstrated to be an effective method of 
reducing a person's fear of snakes. As other 
volunteer subjects will not be receiving the same 
type of treatment as you are, I would appreciate 
your not discussing your particular treatment 
with any one else in the experiment. 
This session is the first of four treatment 
sessions. During each session, you will be connected 
to a physiological monitoring device and a recorder 
which will measure your heart rate to presentations 
of the snake. In addition, video pictures will be 
taken of you during the minute and a half that you 
will be interacting with the snake. After this 
first session, i.e., at the beginning of the second, 
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TABLE 2 
OVERVIEW OF TREATMENT SESSIONS INDICATING 
FEEDBACK AND SPECIFIED SUBJECT BEHAVIORS 
False HR 
Specified Accompanying 
Video Tape Subj ect Video Tape for 
Review Behaviors Appropriate Groups 
Pre-test No review mm mm mm mm _ _ _ _  
Treatment 
session (TS)#1 No review *(1) 118 decreasing to 100 
(TS)#2 TS-#1 (2) 105 decreasing to 90 
(TS)#3 TS-#1, #2 (3) 90 decreasing to 80 
(TS)#4 TS-#1, #2 
#3 (4) 75 decreasing to 68 
Post-test TS-#1, #2 
#3, #4 — — — — *• ~ ~ 
*(1) Subject seated directly in front of snake with box 
closed 
(2) Subject required to lift cage lid half-way open and 
maintain the position during taping 
(3) Subject required to open cage lid completely and leave 
in open position 
(4) Subject required to place fingers and one-half of the 
palm on the top inside of cage during taping 
FIGURE 1 
PHYSICAL LAY-OUT OF THE EQUIPMENT 
% . cs 
Subj ect-»-Z~+8nake-* 7 »-T.V. Camera 
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third and fourth, I will ask that you observe 
yourself on a video monitor. At that time you 
will see yourself during the one and one half 
minute exposure to the snake and will also hear 
your heart rate. After reviewing the audio-video 
tape of the previous sessions, you will be connected 
to the heart rate recorders and video taped for the 
next scheduled session. 
The subject was seated, physiological monitors were 
connected, and the subject was requested to look at the snake 
directly before her. At subsequent sessions, subjects were 
advised of the task as specified in Table 2. After video 
taping the subject interacting with the snake for 90 seconds, 
the subject was thanked and another appointment time arranged. 
When the subject arrived for the second session, she 
was advised prior to reviewing the first taped session that 
the video equipment was not functioning correctly. There­
fore, the picture would be slightly out of focus. Although 
the video was not as it should have been, the audio record­
ing of heart rate was perfect. 
The purpose for video taping the subject slightly out 
of focus was to reduce the possibility of the subject being 
able to perceive any nuances of facial expression which 
might give her cues indicating fear of the snake. Thus the 
subjects would only perceive that the picture on the monitor 
42 
was indeed themselves, and that their heart rates were 
decreasing over sessions. 
Experimental Group II (video-self, audio-no feedback) 
The procedure which this group followed was very 
similar to that followed by experimental Group I. These 
subjects were also connected to what was explained to be a 
physiological monitoring device for measuring their heart 
rate. As these subjects did not receive false audio feed­
back, the instructions read to them were modified, eliminating 
any mention of hearing their heart rates. (See Appendix I.) 
All other treatment procedures remained the same as for 
Group I. 
Experimental Group III (video-model, audio-false HR) 
In an effort to determine to what extent modeling was 
occurring, this group was advised that they would be seeing 
and hearing on video tape another person who was matched to 
them on many relevant variables. (See Appendix J.) Thus, 
subjects were exposed to the snake for 90 seconds "in vivo" 
while their heart rates were proportedly measured and re­
viewed other subjects most like themselves on tape. The 
taped subjects reviewed on sessions two through post-test 
were subjects from Group I matched only for skin color 
(black-white). 
Experimental Group IV (video-model, audio-no feedback) 
The procedure which this group followed was similar to 
that of Group III. The only difference was the exclusion of 
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any mention of hearing audio feedback during the tape review 
sessions. (See Appendix K.) The taped subjects reviewed on 
sessions two through post-test were subjects from Group II 
matched only for skin color (black-white). 
Experimental Group V (video-snake, audio-false HR) 
The subjects in this group were exposed for 90 seconds 
to the snake while performing the behaviors specified for 
each treatment session. Heart rate monitors were attached 
for each of the "in vivo" exposure sessions. However, the 
tape review session was designed to present a video picture 
of the snake only (no subject or model present). The 
accompanying audio feedback was purported to be the sub­
ject1 s heart rate recorded from the previous session. (See 
Appendix L.) 
Experimental Group VI (video-snake, audio-no feedback) 
The specific purpose for including this group was to 
determine how much improvement would result via extinction 
through repeated visual exposures to the snake. Therefore, 
these subjects were exposed for 90 seconds "in vivo" per­
forming the behaviors as specified in Table 2 and reexposed 
to video recordings of the snake only. (See Appendix M.) 
Experimental Group VII (no treatment control) 
These subjects did not receive any treatment but 
participated in the pre- and posttreatment assessments as 
did the subjects in the other groups. Following the pre­
test assessment these subjects were informed that they would 
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be contacted at a later date with further instructions. 
During the time in which posttreatment assessments were 
performed, these subjects were contacted and advised that an 
additional test of their snake fear was required, and an 
appointment time was arranged for posttesting. 
Posttreatment Assessment 
Posttreatment testing followed within two days of the 
fourth treatment session for all subjects with the exception 
of the no-treatment group. The two posttest examiners were 
the same sex as the pre-test and session experimenter. One 
of the examiners was a male graduate student who had run a 
similar study and was well acquainted with the posttest 
procedure. The other examiner was a male undergraduate 
student who received approximately one hour of instruction 
on the posttest procedure. The two posttest examiners were 
unaware of the conditions to which each subject had been 
assigned. 
The BAT, FT, and HR measures were acquired concurrently 
with the readministration of the BAT. Immediately following 
the BAT, subjects were escorted to an adjoining room and 
were readministered the SRIA and PPQ. All subjects were also 
given a questionnaire checking their belief in the independent 
experimental manipulations (see Appendix N). The subjects 
were explained the hypotheses under investigation and why it 
was considered necessary to utilize false heart rate feedback. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
Pretreatment Matching of Groups. Prior to the experi­
mental treatments, all groups were matched with respect to 
the Behavioral Avoidance Test (BAT), Fear Thermometer (FT), 
and the heart rate measure (HR), such that the groups were 
considered equivalent. To verify equivalence among the 
seven experimental groups, one multivariate and three 
separate univariate analyses of variance were computed. 
There were no significant differences between the groups 
(see Tables 3 and 4). Therefore any reduction in fear would 
be reflected by pre-post changes in a positive direction on 
the BAT measure and changes in a negative direction on all 
other dependent measures. 
Sub.ject Attrition. All subjects designated for treat­
ment kept their appointments for the first session. Four 
subjects failed to return for the second and subsequent 
sessions. Three claimed illness was preventing their 
return, while the fourth simply refused to participate. 
Each of the four subjects had been assigned to a different 
experimental group. Therefore, upon the completion of the 
experiment, one subject was selected, using random numbers, 
from Groups I, III, and VII and eliminated for the purpose 
TABLE 3 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON THE PRETREATMENT 
SCORES FOR BEHAVIORAL AVOIDANCE TEST (BAT), 
FEAR THERMOMETER (FT), AND HEART RATE (HR) 
Source 
Log 
(Generalized 
variance) U-statistic df Approximate F df 
Between Groups 17.501 3, 6, 35 18, 93.82 
0.697 0.708 
Within Groups 17.140 
TABLE 4 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON PRETREATMENT SCORES 
FOR BEHAVIORAL AVOIDANCE TEST (BAT), FEAR 
THERMOMETER (FT), AND HEART RATE (HR) 
Source df MS 
BAT Pretreatment Scores 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
6 
35 
0.873 
0.819 
1.066 
FT Pretreatmen.t Scores 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
6 
35 
3.024 
4.386 
0.6895 
HR Pretreatment Scores 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 35 
111.865 
193.584 
0.578 
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of equal N analysis. (The analyses were computed on N = 5 
per cell.) 
A Note of Caution in the Interpretation of the 
Statistical Results. It must be clearly stated that the 
reported results on all univariate analyses (ANOVAS) and 
subsequent post hoc tests should be considered with extreme 
caution. Many statisticians have questioned the appropriate­
ness of performing univariate analyses following non­
significant multivariate analyses (MANOVAS). In order to 
explain and understand the data from this experiment, the 
results from all significant ANOVAS will be fully analyzed, 
regardless of the MANOVA results. However, the extreme 
tentativeness of all conclusions drawn from ANOVAS which 
follow nonsignificant MANOVAS must be stressed. 
Analyses of Dependent Variable Scores Treated as 
Repeated Measures. A multivariate analysis of variance was 
computed for the six experimental groups utilizing the 
dependent variable pretest and posttest scores as repeated 
measures. The result of the MANOVA indicated significance 
on the repeated measure factor F (5, 20) = 51.55, £<.01 
(see Table 5). All other factors and interactions were not 
significant. 
Following the multivariate analysis, each of the five 
dependent measures was separately analyzed with univariate 
analyses of variance. The significant results summarized in 
Table 6 indicated significance on the repeated measure 
TABLE 5 
SUMMARY TABLE ON THE MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE FIVE 
DEPENDENT MEASURES ACROSS SIX EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS TREATING 
THE PRE- AND POSTTEST SCORES AS REPEATED MEASURES 
Log 
(Generalized 
Source Variance) U-statistic df Approximate F df 
Repeated Measure .072 5, 1, 24 51.55** 5, 20 
Scores 
**£ <.01 
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TABLE 6 
SUMMARY TABLE ON THE UNIVARIATE ANALYSES OF 
VARIANCE FOR BAT, FT, HR, PPQ, AND SRIA 
SCORES FOR THE SIX EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS 
TREATING THE PRE AND POSTTEST 
SCORES AS REPEATED MEASURES 
Dependent 
Measure Source df MS F 
BAT Repeated Measure 1 201. 66 73.33** 
Error 24 2. 75 
FT Repeated Measure 1 248. 06 75.39** 
Error 24 3. 29 
HR Repeated Measure 1 1689. 63 30.76** 
Error 24 54. 92 
PPQ Repeated Measure 1 12936. 01 25.69** 
Error 24 503. 35 
SRIA Repeated Measure 1 3588. 26 11.73** 
Error 24 305. 86 
** £<.01 
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factor for each of the dependent measures, BAT, F (1, 24) = 
73.33, £<.01, FT, F (1, 24) - 75.39, £<.01, HR, F (1, 24) = 
30.76, £<.01, PPQ, F (1, 24) - 25.69, £<.01, SRIA, 
F (1, 24) = 11.73, £<.01. There were no additional 
significant main effects or interactions. The significance 
on only the repeated measure factor indicated equivalent 
improvement from pretest to posttest measurement for all 
experimental groups on all five dependent measures. 
Computation of Difference Scores. Data analysis was 
performed on the difference scores, pretreatment to post-
treatment, for the five dependent measures (BAT, FT, HR, PPQ, 
SRIA) (see Table 7). The score for the BAT was calculated 
by subtracting the last completed BAT item on the posttest 
from the last completed BAT pretest item. The FT difference 
score was calculated by comparing the fear rating given for 
the last completed BAT item on the pretest with the rating 
given to that same item on the posttest. The heart rate 
score was computed by comparing the beats per minute (BPM) 
on the last item completed on the pretest to the BPM for 
that same item on the posttest. The difference scores for 
the PPQ and SRIA were calculated by pre-post comparisons. 
Analysis of Six Experimental Groups (Excluding the No-
treatment Group). A two-way (feedback x treatment) multi­
variate analysis of variance was computed on the difference 
scores for the six experimental groups. The statistical 
TABLE 7 
PRE,POST AND DIFFERENCE SCORE MEANS FOR EACH EXPERIMENTAL 
GROUP ACROSS ALL DEPENDENT MEASURES 
Group BAT (+) FT ( - )  HR ( - )  
Pre Post Di££ Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
I Self - F.F. 12.20 16.40 4.20 8.40 4.40 4.00 105.38 93.16 12.22 
II Self - N.F.F. 12.20 16.20 4.00 9.60 6.00 3.60 98.46 92.14 6.34 
Ill Model - F.F. 12.80 15.00 2.20 9.60 6.60 3.00 110.92 98.20 12.72 
IV Model - N.F.F. 12.60 16.80 4.20 8.80 5.00 3.80 103.16 92.98 10.18 
V Snake - F.F. 12.40 18.20 5.80 7.60 2.00 5.60 110.46 97.54 12.92 
VI Snake - N.F.F. 12.20 13.80 1.60 8.40 4.00 4.40 105.02 95.72 9.30 
VII No Treatment 111. 80 12.40 .60 9.80 5.80 4.00 102.88 94.32 8.56 
(Table 7 continued, next page.) 
TABLE 7 (Continued) 
Group PPQ (-) SRIA (-) 
I Self - F.F. 
Pre Post Dxff Pre Post Dif f 
78 . 20 40.60 37.60 166.40 147.20 19. 20 
II Self - N.F.F. 111.80 63.40 48.40 187.60 161.80 25.80 
Ill Model - F.F. 109.60 92. 20 17.40 170.20 169.40 0.80 
IV Model - N.F.F. 87.80 69.40 18.40 162.60 153.00 9.60 
V Snake - F.F. 76.60 39. 00 37.60 149.20 127.20 22.00 
VI Snake - N.F.F. 81.60 64.80 16.80 169.80 152.80 17.00 
VII No Treatment 62.60 43.40 19.20 165.20 150.40 14.80 
54 
result was not significant for the video F (10, 38) = .835, 
£<.59, audio F (5, 28) = .808, £<.55, or video X audio 
interaction F (10, 38) = 1.52, p <.16 (see Table 8). 
Separate univariate analyses, computed on each of the five 
dependent variables, were also not significant (see Table 9). 
Analysis of Six Experimental Groups and No-Treatment 
Group. A multivariate analysis of variance was also 
computed on the difference scores for the six experimental 
groups and the no-treatment controls across all dependent 
measures. A summary of the analysis is presented in Table 
10. The statistical result only approached significance, 
F (30, 112) = 1.451, £<.08, indicating no differential 
treatment effects among the conditions across all five 
dependent measures. 
Following the multivariate analysis, each of the five 
dependent measures was separately analyzed with a univariate 
analysis of variance. The summary of these results is pre­
sented in Table 11. The results indicated only the BAT 
measure reached significance, F (6, 28) = 5.392, £<.01. 
O 
The strength of association, W , between treatment conditions 
and the BAT change scores indicated that the treatments 
accounted for 15% of the total variability. 
A Newman-Keuls post hoc comparison of the BAT treat­
ment means was performed to determine the significant 
difference among the seven conditions. The results of the 
TABLE 8 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF VARIANCE ON THE DIFFERENCE 
SCORES FOR THE FIVE DEPENDENT MEASURES ACROSS 
SIX EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT GROUPS 
Statistical Test 
Methods Source df F Prob>F 
Hote11ing-Lawley s Video 
o
 
r-
t 
38 0. 835 0. 598 
Trace 
Audio 5, 20 0. 808 0. 558 
Video X Audio 10, 38 1. 521 0. 169 
TABLE 9 
SUMMARY OF UNIVARIATE ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR THE 
FIVE DEPENDENT VARIABLE DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR 
THE SIX EXPERIMENTAL TREATMENT GROUPS 
Dependent 
Measure Source df F Value P>F 
Video 2 0. 368 0. 700 
BAT Audio 1 0. 870 0. 360 
Video X Audio 2 0. ,503 0. 537 
Video 2 1. 050 0.366 
FT Audio 1 0. 080 0.778 
Video X Audio 2 0. 383 0.690 
Video 2 0. 124 0.883 
HR Audio 1 1. 099 0.304 
Video X Audio 2 0. 066 0.935 
Video 2 1. 599 0. 221 
PPQ Audio 1 0. 067 0. 797 
Video X Audio 2 0. 649 0. 505 
SRIA 
Video 2 1.538 0.234 
Audio 1 0.196 0.661 
Video X Audio 2 0.263 0.774 
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TABLE 10 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON THE 
DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR THE BAT, FT, 
HR, PPQ, AND SRIA ACROSS ALL GROUPS 
Statistical Test Method df F Prob>F 
Hotelling-Lawley's 
Trace 
30, 112 1.451 0.084 
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TABLE 11 
SUMMARY OF UNIVARIATE ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR 
BAT, FT, HR, PPQ AND SRIA DIFFERENCE 
SCORES FOR ALL EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS 
AND THE NO-TREATMENT GROUP 
Dependent Measure df F Value Prob> F 
BAT 6, 28 3.392 0.012* 
FT 6, 28 0.449 0.839 
HR 6, 28 0.264 0.947 
PPQ 6, 28 0.950 0.523 
SRIA 6, 28 0.691 0.660 
*£ < . 05 
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comparison are presented in Table 12. The test indicated 
that Group V (view the snake and receive false audio feed­
back) differed significantly from Group VII (no-treatment) 
(j> <.01) and Group VI (£<.05) in performing more items on 
the BAT. 
In order to facilitate understanding and explaining 
the lack of differential experimental effects, an additional 
table of results is presented. The overall difference score 
means and standard deviations computed for all subjects are 
shown in Table 13. 
Analyses Relating to Borkovec's Hypotheses 
Analyses based upon pretest physiological heart rate 
activity. Borkovec (1973a) hypothesized that subjects with 
low pulse rates (as measured on pretests) demonstrate greater 
approach change as a function of false physiological feed­
back than those subjects with initially high pulse rates. 
In keeping with Borkovec's hypothesis, differential results 
would be expected in this experiment based upon the sub­
jects' initial level of physiological reactivity (defined 
as the HR measure). Subjects who received an experimental 
treatment were blocked into groups on the following dimen­
sions: 1. Those subjects who were exposed to false audio 
feedback and those who were not (regardless of the video 
conditions). 2. Within these two groups, the subject's 
pretest heart rate scores were rank-ordered into three 
groups of five. Those subjects with the highest pretest HR 
TABLE 12 
NEWMAN-KEULS COMPARISON OF TREATMENT MEANS FOR BAT DIFFERENCE SCORES 
C.V. C.V. 
for for 
VII VI III II I IV V r =.05 =.01 
Group VII 1.00 1.60 3. 40 3. 60 3. 60 5.20** 7 4.32 5.18 
VI .60 2. 40 2. 60 2. 60 4.20* 6 4.16 5.03 
III 1. 80 2. 00 2. 00 3.60 5 3.98 4.85 
II 0. 20 0. 20 1.80 4 3.73 4.62 
I 0. 00 1.60 3 3.38 4.30 
IV 1.60 2 2.81 3.76 
V 1 
*p < . 05 
**£ <.01 
TABLE 13 
DIFFERENCE SCORE MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
FOR ALL EXPERIMENTAL SUBJECTS 
Dependent Mean SD of 
Variable Difference Differences 
BAT 3.22 2.62 
FT -4.06 2.55 
HR -10.32 9.94 
PPQ -27.91 29.59 
SRIA -15.37 23.02 
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scores were labeled as the high group, the next highest 
group of five as medium, and the remaining five as low in 
reactivity. The mean pretest HR scores for each group are 
presented in Table 14. Because the subjects were blocked on 
this pretest measure, as expected there was significance in 
the ANOVA of their pretest scores for both the feedback 
variable F (1, 24) = 7.20, p .05 and the levels of 
reactivity F (2, 24) = 32.20, p .01 (see Table 15). 
A multivariate analysis of variance was computed on 
the difference scores across all five dependent measures 
for the six groups. The results of the test were not 
significant (see Table 16). Separate univariate analyses 
were also computed for each of the dependent measures. The 
summary of these results is presented in Table 17. The 
results indicated only the HR measure reached significance 
F (2, 24) = 8.96, p .001. The strength of association, 
O 
W , between levels of reactivity and the HR change scores 
indicated that reactivity accounted for 38% of the total 
variability. 
A Newman-Keuls post hoc comparison of the HR treatment 
mean difference scores was performed to determine the 
significant differences between the low, medium, and high 
subject groups. The results of the comparison are presented 
in Table 18. The test indicated that the high and medium 
TABLE 14 
MEAN PRETEST HEART-RATE SCORES FOR 
PHYSIOLOGICAL REACTIVITY ANOVA 
Subj ects 
Receiving 
False Audio 
Feedback 
Subj ects 
Not Receiving 
False Audio 
Feedback 
High 
Physio. Activity 
125. 6 114.12 
Medium 
Physio. Activity 
108.02 102.76 
Low 
Physio. Activity 
95.58 89.8 
$4 
TABLE 15 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON PRETEST HEART RATE 
SCORES FOR SUBJECTS DESIGNATED 
AS HIGH, MEDIUM AND LOW IN 
PHYSIOLOGICAL REACTIVITY 
Source df MS F 
Feedback 1 406. 29 7. 20* 
Reactivity 2 1817. 77 32. 2** 
Feedback & Reactivity 2 25. 56 0. 45 
Error (within) 24 56. 42 
**£ < . 01 
.05 
TABLE 16 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF VARIANCE ON THE DIFFERENCE SCORES 
FOR ALL DEPENDENT MEASURES ACROSS SUBJECTS GROUPED 
INTO THREE LEVELS OF PRETEST PULSE-RATE ACTIVITY 
Statistical 
Test Method Source df F Prob>F 
Hotellirig-Lawley' s Audio Feedback 5, 20 .797 .565 
Trace HR Reactivity 10, 38 1.71 .111 
Feedback X Reactivity 10, 38 . 699 .720 
TABLE 17 
SUMMARY OF UNIVARIATE ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR BAT, FT, HR, 
PPQ AND SRIA DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR SUBJECTS GROUPED 
INTO THREE LEVELS OF PRETEST PULSE-RATE ACTIVITY 
Dependent 
Measure Source df F Value Prob.> F 
Feedback 1 0. 680 0.417 
BAT Reactivity 2 0. 487 0.625 
Feed. X React. 2 0. 695 0.513 
Feedback 1 0. 077 0.783 
FT Reactivity 2 0. 729 0.503 
Feed. X React. 2 0. 120 0.886 
Feedback 1 1. 901 0.180 
HR Reactivity 2 8. 960 0.001** 
Feed. X React. 2 0. ,116 0.889 
Feedback 1 0. 060 0.807 
PPQ Reactivity 2 0. 205 0.817 
Feed. X React. 2 0. 632 0.544 
Feedback 1 0. 211 0.650 
SRIA Reactivity 2 0. 502 0.616 
Feed. X React. 2 2. 348 0.115 
**£ <.01 
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TABLE 18 
NEWMAN-KEULS COMPARISON OF TREATMENT 
MEANS FOR HR DIFFERENCE SCORES 
C.V. 
Low Medium High for 
Reactive Reactive Reactive r =.05 
C.V. 
for 
= .01 
Low Reactive 9.31* 14.94** 3 8.79 11.21 
Medium Reactive 5.63 2 7.28 9.80 
High Reactive 1 
**p <.01 
*£ <.05 
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groups were significantly different from the group defined 
as low reactivity (£<.01, £<.05 respectively), but did not 
differ from each other. 
Analyses Based upon Pretest Perception of Heart Rate 
Activity. Borkovec (1973a) hypothesized that subjects' 
perception of physiological activity and actual physiological 
reactions were separate dimensions. Borkovec (1973b) re­
ported that subjects who were accurate perceivers demon­
strated greater mean approach and pulse rate reduction than 
inaccurate perceivers. Therefore, data from this experiment 
was blocked on the following dimensions: 1. Those subjects 
who were exposed to audio feedback versus those who were not 
(regardless of the video condition). 2. Within these two 
groups, the PPQ (see Appendix F) pretest scores from item 
numbers 9, 10, and 11, were summed. The summed scores from 
the three items, which were specifically related to the sub­
ject's perception of heart rate activity, were rank-ordered 
into groups of five subjects each. The five subjects with 
the highest summed scores were labeled as the high perception 
group. The next highest group of five as medium and the 
remaining five as low in heart rate activity perception. The 
mean summed pretest perception scores for each group are pre­
sented in Table 19. 
Multivariate analyses of variance were computed on the 
difference scores across all five dependent measures for the 
feedback and heart rate perception variables. The results 
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TABLE 19 
MEAN PRETEST SCORES FOR THE SUMMATION OF PPQ 
HEART RATE ITEM NUMBERS 9, 10, AND 11 
Subjects Receiving 
Faise Audio Feedback 
Subjects not 
Receiving False 
Audio Feedback 
High in 
Heart Rate 
Perception 
23.4 22.4 
Medium in 
Heart Rate 
Perception 
19.4 15.8 
Low in 
Heart Rate 
Perception 
9.8 7.8 
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presented in Table 20 indicated no significant effect for 
the audio feedback or perception of heart rate variables. 
Separate univariate analyses were computed for each of the 
dependent measures. The summary of these results is pre­
sented in Table 21. The results indicated significant main 
effect on the PPQ measure, F (2, 24) = 5.625, jj^.009 and 
the SRIA measure, F (2, 24) = 4.214, £<£.026. The statis­
tically significant result for both the PPQ and SRIA was 
congruent considering the high correlation (r = .736) 
between the two dependent measures. 
A Newman-Keuls post hoc comparison of the mean 
difference scores was performed to determine the significant 
differences between the low, medium, and high perception 
subject groups for both the PPQ and the SRIA. The result of 
the comparison for the PPQ is presented in Table 22 and for 
the SRIA in Table 23. Both the PPQ and SRIA tests indicated 
that the medium perception group differed only from the 
group classified as low in heart rate perception (£<.01 
and £ <.05 respectively). 
Summary of Treatment Effects. The percent improvement 
(difference score divided by pretest score) for each group 
over the five dependent measures was calculated (see Table 
24). Figure 2 plots the three groups which received false 
audio feedback and the no-treatment group. Figure 3 shows 
the three groups which did not receive false feedback and, 
for comparison, the no-treatment group. 
TABLE 20 
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSES OF VARIANCE ON THE DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR 
ALL DEPENDENT MEASURES ACROSS SUBJECTS GROUPED INTO THREE 
LEVELS OF PRETEST HEART RATE PERCEPTION 
Statistical 
Test Method Source df F Prob>F 
Hotelling-Lawley1s Audio Feedback 5, 20 .716 .620 
Trace HR Perception 10, 38 1 = 769 .100 
Feedback X Perception 10, 38 2.34 .028 
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TABLE 21 
SUMMARY OF UNIVARIATE ANALYSES OF VARIANCE FOR BAT, FT, HR, 
PPQ AND SRIA DIFFERENCE SCORES FOR SUBJECTS GROUPED 
INTO THREE LEVELS OF PRETEST HEART-RATE PERCEPTION 
Dependent 
Measure Source df F Value Prob> F 
Feedback 1 1.024 .321 
BAT Perception 2 .775 .525 
Feed X Percep 2 1.26 .287 
Feedback 1 .105 .747 
FT Perception 2 1.298 .291 
Feed X Percep 2 1.571 .243 
Feedback 1 1 .313 .263 
HR Perception 2 1. ,438 .256 
Feed X Percep 2 1 .126 .341 
Feedback 1 .084 .774 
PPQ Perception 2 5. 625 .009** 
Feed X Percep 2 ,246 .785 
Feedback 1 .235 .631 
SRIA Perception 2 4. 214 .026* 
Feed X Percep 2 ,351 .712 
**£ <.01 
*£< .05 
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TABLE 22 
NEWMAN-KEULS COMPARISON OF TREATMENT 
MEANS FOR PPQ DIFFERENCE SCORES 
C.V. C.V. 
Low High Medium for for 
Perception Perception Perception r =.05 =.01 
Low 17.6 42.3** 3 31.24 39.82 
Perception 
High 24.7 2 25.86 34.82 
Perception 
Medium 1 
Perception 
**£ <.01 
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TABLE 23 
NEWMAN-KEULS COMPARISON OF TREATMENT 
MEANS FOR SRIA DIFFERENCE SCORES 
C.V. 
Low High Medium for 
Perception Perception Perception r =.05 
C.V. 
for 
= .01 
Low 
Perception 
12.4 29.2* 3 24.88 31.72 
High 
Perception 
1 6 . 8  2 20.61 27.73 
Medium 
Perception 
1 
< . 05 
TABLE 24 
PERCENT IMPROVEMENT FOR EACH GROUP OVER 
THE FIVE DEPENDENT MEASURES 
I II III IV V VI VII 
BAT 34 33 17 33 47 13 05 
FT 48 38 31 48 .74 52 59 
HR 12 06 11 10 12 09 08 
PPQ 48 43 16 21 49 21 31 
SRIA 12 14 00 06 16 10 09 
to-
hr biat 
Figure 2. Percent improvement demonstrated by groups 
I, III, V (all receiving false heart irate 
feedback) and no treatment Group (VII) on 
the five dependent measures. 
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Figure 3. Percent improvement demonstrated by Groups 
II, IV, VI (not receiving false heart rate 
feedback) and no treatment Group (VII) on 
the five dependent measures. 
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Only Group V (view the snake with false feedback) 
demonstrated consistently higher improvement percentages 
across all dependent measures (see Figure 2). This group 
was also the only one to exceed the no-treatment group 
across all of the dependent measures. 
Postexperimental check on the Independent Manipu­
lations . The postexperimental questionnaire (see Appendix 
L) indicated that subjects believed their feedback (video 
and/or audio) to be veridical, In addition, all statements 
made by subjects during their review of previously taped 
sessions in no way indicated awareness of non-verdicality. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
Discussion of Primary Results 
The results from this experiment indicated that all 
experimental treatment groups (Groups I-VI) improved on all 
five dependent measures. This was indicated by the highly 
significant pre-post repeated measure factor (Table 5 and 
Table 6) . In addition, the MANOVA (Table 8) calculated 
across all dependent measures for the six experimental treat­
ment groups and the ANOVAS (Table 9) comparing the treatment 
groups on each of the five dependent measures were not 
significant. Thus, it may be concluded that all of the 
experimental treatments were equally effective in producing 
change across the response measures. 
In subsequent analyses, the six experimental groups 
were compared with each other and the no-treatment control 
group. The result of this MANOVA (Table 10) achieved 
marginal significance, which would again indicate equivalent 
improvement across all dependent measures for the experi­
mental groups and the no-treatment group. With the exception 
of the significant BAT measure, all other ANOVAS (Table 11) 
were nonsignificant, reaffirming that all seven groups 
improved equally. The post hoc examination of BAT mean 
difference scores (Table 12) indicated that Group V (snake 
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only and false audio feedback) demonstrated significantly 
greater improvement than Group VI (snake only and no audio 
feedback) and Group VII (no-treatment). Prior to discussing 
the BAT post hoc analysis, possible explanations will be 
proposed to explain the equivalent improvements demonstrated 
by the no-treatment and experimental groups, on all measures 
except the BAT. 
Discussion of the Overall Pre-Post Improvements 
As stated previously, the results of the MANOVA and 
ANOVAS for the six experimental groups were nonsignificant. 
A logical approach may be used to determine why all experi­
mental treatments demonstrated essentially equivalent improve­
ment. The purpose of such an approach would be to define a 
common factor which occurred in all treatments. There was 
one factor which appeared in all treatment conditions (and 
to a certain extent in the no-treatment group). The common 
factor was the multiple "in vivo" exposures to the fear 
stimulus. Therefore, it may be proposed that the equivalent 
improvements for all the experimental groups may have been 
the result of extinction. The fact that the multiple 
exposures occurred in a gradual manner, becoming more 
intimate with each session, may also be considered a form of 
"in vivo" desensitization. This concurs with Davison and 
Wilson (1973) who have proposed that extinction, operating 
within a systematic desensitization paradigm, is the most 
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viable of all current hypotheses explaining the process of 
fear reduction. 
A less supportable, but possible explanation for the 
equivalent improvements may be conceptualized as motivational 
or demand characteristics operating on the subjects. As all 
subjects were young females, there may have been subtle self-
imposed demands to please the oppositely sexed experimenter 
and posttest examiners. It is interesting to speculate that 
the current results might have changed considerably had the 
subjects been older and the same sex as the experimenter and 
examiners. 
The results from this study also suggest that viewing 
a model on video, regardless of feedback, may not have the 
same impact or effect as when subjects are requested to 
covertly imagine a fear provoking scene. The lack of a 
modeling effect in the current study is not consonant with 
other modeling studies which showed treatment groups improved 
over no-treatment controls. Cautela et al. (1974) demon­
strated that covert and overt modeling were equivalent in re­
ducing avoidance behavior. Meichenbaum (1971) utilized 
filmed models in demonstrating the superiority of coping ver­
sus mastery models in overcoming anxiety. In addition, 
Kazdin's (1973, 1974a, 1974c) research on avoidance behavior 
primarily investigated covert desensitization, manipulating 
model similarity versus dissimilarity in coping versus mastery 
situations. Kazdin's results have consistently demonstrated 
82 
the superiority of the similar-coping model in reducing 
avoidance behavior. This finding was not confirmed by the 
results from this experiment. However, as Kazdin utilized 
primarily covert rather than overt techniques in his 
research, his results cannot be completely generalized to 
this experiment. The disparity in results questions why the 
most similar of all models (viewing oneself) coping with the 
anxiety producing stimulus was not different from any other 
treatment approach? One possible explanation may be 
hypothesized in the distinction between covertly imagining 
oneself performing some avoidance behavior and actually 
engaging in these same behaviors prior to an overt (viewing 
another model) or covert review. In other words, it is 
possible that covert behavioral rehearsal of the activity 
must occur as a necessary precondition for changing overt 
and other behavioral modes. 
Discussion of Nonsignificant Results 
The nonsignificant experimental results allow more 
definitive conclusions to be drawn in reference to the 
principle and corollary hypotheses under investigation. As 
the two groups who viewed themselves on video, with or with­
out audio feedback, were not significantly different from 
each other, the modeling groups, or the no-treatment group, 
it may be concluded that the divergence of perception (Jones 
& Nisbett, 1971) and reattribution of positive qualities 
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from actor to observer hypothesis has no empirical support 
from this study. 
A possible explanation for the lack of differential 
effects, with the exception of the BAT, has been proposed by 
Borkovec and Glasgow (1973). They reported results 
indicating no significant differences in approach scores 
between feedback and no-feedback groups when subjects had 
prior exposure to the fear stimulus on a pretest and when a 
high-demand posttest was utilized. As the present study 
utilized a high demand pre- and posttest, and possible 
conclusion is that the same mitigating parameters reported 
in Borkovec and Glasgow's (1973) study were operating in this 
study. This would possibly explain why the treatment groups 
did not differ among themselves. 
Discussion of BAT Results 
The BAT post hoc analysis is most difficult to explain. 
As stated previously, Newman-Keuls comparisons indicated that 
only Group V was significantly different from Groups VI and 
Group VII. It may be recalled that Group VI was exposed to 
the snake "in vivo," as were the other treatment groups, and 
reexposed to the snake only on videotape without audio 
feedback. It is possible that the subjects in this group 
were not convinced that their treatment procedure was an 
effective method of reducing fear. If the face validity of 
the treatment procedure was much lower than the other treat­
ment groups, the subjects may have reacted as if they were 
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receiving no treatment at all. Hence, Group VI's reactions 
as measured on the BAT would closely approximate the actual 
no-treatment group. It is possible that Group V demon­
strated a superior performance on the BAT measure by chance. 
That is, the subjects who were assigned to Group V were 
simply more cooperative or "better" subjects. However, it 
is important to note that when charting the percentage 
improvement (Figure 2), Group V demonstrated the most 
consistent and also the highest percentages across all 
dependent measures. 
Thus it may be concluded with a minimal amount of 
empirical support that viewing the snake on video and 
receiving false heart-rate feedback results in reduced fear 
behaviors (particularly motor behavior). 
Discussion of Physiological Reactivity Results 
It was stated in the introduction that Borkovec 
(1973a, 1973b) had published studies supporting his 
hypothesis that false physiological feedback or "external 
demand cue manipulation" (Borkovec, 1973a) would be 
effective in changing behavior when actual physiological 
cues were absent. In addition, he hypothesized that sub­
jects who were accurate perceivers would demonstrate greater 
mean approach and pulse rate reduction than inaccurate 
perceivers. The logical deduction from Borkovec's hypoth­
eses to this experiment would assume that differential 
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results would be expected based upon the subjects' initial 
level of pretest heart rate activity, their perception of 
that activity, and whether or not they received false heart 
rate feedback. 
The multivariate analysis (Table 16) on the three 
levels of heart rate activity did not indicate any 
significant change nor did the univariate analyses except 
on the HR measure (Table 17). Due to the nonsignificant 
multivariate analysis and the fact that the subjects who 
were classified as high in reactivity were most likely 
approaching the extreme end of a finite scale, the 
conclusions are most tentative. However, the post hoc 
analysis (Table 18) results indicated that the HR measure 
confirmed Borkovec's hypothesis as the two groups with the 
higher initial pulse rates were significantly different from 
the low pulse rate group. 
The multivariate analysis based upon the subject's 
perception of heart rate activity was not significant (Table 
20). The two significant univariate analyses (Table 21), 
PPQ and SRIA, were expected as the subjects' scores were 
blocked on their subjective perceptions of heart rate 
activity (which was a part of both questionnaires). The 
results from the Newman-Keuls post hoc comparisons (Tables 
22 and 23) for both measures were similar in that both 
comparisons indicated that the group classified as medium 
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in perception of heart rate activity were significantly 
different from the group low in perception. These results 
would not have been predicted from Borkovec's hypotheses. 
It should be noted that all conclusions relating to 
Borkovec's hypotheses from this study are most tenuous. The 
data used in examining his hypotheses were blocked on 
specified dimensions without regard to the experimental 
groups from which they were taken. The assignment of data 
from different treatment groups could possibly confound any 
definitive empirical support for his hypotheses. In 
addition, the groups classified as high in heart rate percep­
tion and heart rate reactivity had the greatest room for 
change. Therefore, a ceiling effect for the low HR group 
and statistical regression toward the mean could account for 
the results of this study. 
Summary 
In conclusion, the experimental results failed to 
substantiate the major hypothesis under investigation. 
There was no statistical evidence nor was there even a 
trend in the data to support a reattribution hypothesis 
occurring within the current experimental paradigm. As all 
experimental groups and the no-treatment group demonstrated 
almost equivalent improvement on all measures, with the 
exception of the BAT, the defense of any theoretical system 
operating within this experiment in reducing a subject's 
fear would be most tentative. 
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Name Instructor 
GENERAL SCREENING QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please answer these following questions as honestly as 
possible. Thank you. 
1. To what degree are you afraid of snakes? 
Place one X next to the level which is most applicable. 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
To what degree do you experience test anxiety prior to 
a test? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
3. To what degree do you feel depressed? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
4. To what degree are you disturbed about speaking in 
public? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
To what degree do you have trouble with insomnia (i.e., 
taking more than two hours to fall asleep at night)? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
To what degree do you feel anxious in situations 
involving interactions with other people? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
To what degree are you afraid of small insects? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
8. To what degree are you afraid of rats? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
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9. To what degree are you afraid of speaking up in class? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
10. To what degree are you afraid of speaking to a professor 
in his office? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
11. To what degree are you afraid of asserting yourself 
towards others? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
12. To what degree do you feel your study skills are 
deficient? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
13. To what degree do you suffer from headaches? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
14. To what degree do you consider yourself to be under­
weight? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
15. To what degree do you consider yourself to be over­
weight? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
16. To what degree do you feel you have difficulty in 
carrying on a conversation with another person? 
Not at all A fair amount Very 
A little Much much 
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Participant Information Sheet 
PLEASE READ 
Dear Participant: 
You are being asked to participate in a study of fear 
reduction. A first requirement of such a study is an 
accurate measure of a person's fear. The examiners will be 
attempting to get such a measure by actively encouraging you 
to perform fearful items in a prearranged test situation. 
Please cooperate with them. 
The test involves a snake. His name is Balboa. He is 
a non-poisonous boa constrictor of approximately four feet 
in length. He has been used in many such experiments and is 
quite harmless. Like most snakes, you will see him flick his 
tongue out. This is not any indication of danger. Like 
most snakes Balboa has poor eyesight. He uses his tongue 
as a scent receptor to explore his enviornment. In touching 
Balboa, you will find that he is not wet or slimy, rather 
he is dry and cool. His coolness is a result of the fact 
that he is not warmblooded. Therefore his body temperature 
is room temperature and that is cooler than your body 
temperature. When you hold him, it is quite likely that he 
will coil around your arm. This is done purely for support. 
An animal of his length cannot be easily supported between 
two hands. Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sincerely, 
The Experimenter 
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Behavioral Avoidance Test 
(BAT) 
Sitting 8% feet from a caged snake. 
Sitting 7% feet from a caged snake. 
Sitting 6% feet from a caged snake. 
Sitting 5% feet from a caged snake. 
Sitting 4% feet from a caged snake. 
Sitting 3% feet from a caged snake. 
Sitting 2% feet from a caged snake. 
Sitting 1% feet from a caged snake. 
Sitting directly before a caged snake. 
Touch the side of the cage with a bare hand. 
Open the lid of the cage one-half way for two seconds. 
Open the lid of the cage all the way and let it remain 
open. 
Place the flat palm of bare hand on the inside bottom 
of the cage for two seconds. 
Touching the snake on top of its head with gloved hand. 
Touching the snake on top of its head with bare hand. 
Picking up the snake with one gloved hand two inches 
off the bottom of the cage. 
Picking up the snake with bare hand two inches off the 
bottom of the cage. 
Picking up the snake with two gloved hands for two 
seconds. 
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19) Picking up the snake with two bare hands for two 
seconds. 
20) Holding the snake near chest with two gloved hands for 
fifteen seconds. 
21) Holding the snake near chest with two bare hands for 
fifteen seconds. 
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Instructions Read to Subjects 
During Fear Assessments 
I am going to give you certain specific instructions to 
follow, and you should do exactly as you are instructed to 
do. Please do not ask any questions at this time. Simply 
follow my directions. You will be requested to perform a 
series of steps of increasing approach to a non-poisonous 
snake. First I will describe the nature of the activities 
that you are to perform. Then you will state your fear on 
a scale from one to ten, one being no fear and ten being 
terrified. After you have estimated your fear from one to 
ten, you will be required to complete the step described 
to you. 
To repeat, the procedure is as follows: first, you will be 
told the nature of the step that you are to perform. 
Second, you will estimate your fear on a scale from one to 
ten. Third, you will perform the step which has been 
described to you. Do you have any questions? 
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Personal Reactions Questionnaire 
Your name 
Phone no. 
Alternative phone no. 
Local address 
This packet consists of various questionnaires 
designed to further assess your reactions to anxiety-
provoking situations. This information will be kept 
confidential, so please be as honest as possible in 
describing your reactions. 
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Personal Reactions Questionnaire 1 
Name 
Please circle the appropriate number from one to five 
describing your reaction to the situation at the top of 
each section. 
Here is an example: 
You are about to go on a roller coaster. 
Heart beats faster 12 3 4 5 
Not at all Much faster 
If your heart beats much faster in this situation, you would 
darken alternative 5l IF your heart beats somewhat faster, 
you would darken either alternative 2, 3, or 4 depending 
on how much faster; if in this situation your heart does 
not beat faster at all, you would darken alternative 1. 
A. Thinking about a snake 
1. Heart beats faster 12 3 4 5 
Not at all Much faster 
2. Get an "uneasy feeling". 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very 
strongly 
3. Emotions disrupt action 1 2 
Not at all 
\ 
3 4 5 
Very 
disruptive 
4. Feel exhilarated and 
thrilled 1 2 
Very much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
5. Want to avoid situation 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very much 
6. Perspire 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Perspire 
much 
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7. Need to urinate 
frequently 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very 
frequently 
8. Enjoy the challenge 1 2 
Enjoy 
much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
9. Mouth gets dry 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very dry 
10. Become immobilized 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Completely 
11. Get full feeling in 
stomach 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very full 
12. Seek experiences 
like this 1 2 
Very much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
13. Have loose bowels 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very much 
14. Experience nausea 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Much nausea 
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B. Looking at a caged snake at a distance of 10 feet 
1. Heart beats faster 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Much faster 
2. Get an "uneasy feeling" 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very 
strongly 
3. Emotions disrupt action 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very 
disruptive 
4. Feel exhilarated and 
thrilled 1 2 
Very much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
5. Want to avoid situation 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very much 
6. Perspire 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Perspire 
much 
7. Need to urinate 
frequently 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very 
frequently 
8. Enjoy the challenge 1 2 
Enjoy much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
9. Mouth gets dry 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very dry 
10. Become immobilized 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Completely 
11. Get full feeling 
in stomach 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very full 
12. Seek experiences 
like this 1 2 
Very much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
13. Have loose bowels 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very much 
14. Experience nausea 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Much nausea 
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c. Sitting directly in front of a caged snake. 
1. Heart beats faster 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Much faster 
2. Get an "uneasy feeling" 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very 
Strongly 
3. Emotions disrupt action 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very 
disruptive 
4. Feel exhilarated and 
thrilled 1 2 
Very much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
5. Want to avoid situation 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very much 
6. Perspire 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Perspire 
much 
7. Need to urinate 
frequently 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very 
frequently 
8. Enjoy the challenge 1 2 
Enj oy much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
9. Mouth gets dry 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very dry 
10. Become immobilized 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Completely 
11. Get full feeling 
in stomach 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very full 
12. Seek experiences 
like this 1 2 
Very much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
13. Have loose bowels 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very much 
14. Experience nausea 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Much nausea 
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D. Holding a snake with bare hands 
1. Heart beats faster 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Much faster 
2. Get an "uneasy feeling" 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very 
strongly 
3. Emotions disrupt action 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very 
disruptive 
4. Feel exhilarated 
and thrilled 1 2 
Very much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
5. Want to avoid situation 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very much 
6. Perspire 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Perspire 
much 
7. Need to urinate 
frequently 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
'Very 
frequently 
8. Enjoy the challenge 1 2 
Enjoy much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
9. Mouth gets dry 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Very dry 
10. Become immobilized 1 2 
Not at all 
3 4 5 
Completely 
11. Get full feeling 
in stomach 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very full 
12. Seek experiences 
like this 1 2 
Very much 
3 4 5 
Not at all 
13. Have loose bowels 1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
Very much 
14. Experience nausea 12 3 4 5 
Not at all Much nausea 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE PERCEPTION OF FEELING 
This questionnaire is designed to give you an 
opportunity to describe your subjective experience in 
relation to several dimensions of anxiety. 
There are no catch questions in this questionnaire. 
Please read each question in each scale very carefully 
and consider your answer. 
For each question there is a scale from 0 to 9. The 
end points are statements of extreme feelings or attitudes. 
Circle that number which you think best indicates the state 
of your feelings or attitude about the particular question. 
For example, if a question asked, "How happy are 
you right now?", and you feel that you're somewhat happy 
but not very happy, you might answer the following scale 
by indicating the number 6 or the number 7 on the answer 
sheet. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
extremely extremely 
unhappy happy 
Answer each of the following 21 items on the answer 
sheet on the next page. Be sure the number of the item on 
the answer sheet corresponds to the number of the item on 
the questionnaire. 
Hi 
THINK ABOUT EACH QUESTION CAREFULLY BEFORE YOU ANSWER. 
CIRCLE ONLY ONE NUMBER ON EACH SCALE. 
1. When you are with the snake, are you aware of many 
bodily reactions? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Aware of very few Aware of very many 
2. When you are with the snake, how often are you aware of 
your bodily reactions? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Never Always 
3. When you are with the snake, does your face become hot? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Does not change Becomes very hot 
4. When you are with the snake, do your hands become cold? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
No change Very cold 
5. When you are with the snake, do you perspire? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not at all A great deal 
6. When you are with the snake, does your mouth become dry? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Never Always 
7. When you are with the snake, are you aware of increased 
muscle tension? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
No increased tension A great deal of tension 
11}$ 
8. When you are with the snake, do you get a headache? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Never Always 
9. When you are with the snake, how often are you aware of 
any change in your heart action? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Never Always 
10. When you are with the snake, do you experience accelerated 
heart beat? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
No change Great acceleration 
11. When you are with the snake, does the intensity of your 
heart beat increase? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Does not change Increases to 
extreme pounding 
12. When you are with the snake, how often are you aware of 
change in your breathing? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Never Always 
13. When you are with the snake, does your breathing become 
more rapid? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
No change Very rapid 
14. When you are with the snake, do you breathe more deeply? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
No change Much more deeply 
U9 
15. When you are with the snake, do you breathe more 
shallowly? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
No change Much more shallowly 
16. When you are with the snake, do you feel as if blood 
rushes to your head? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Never Always 
17. When you are with the snake, do you get a lump in your 
throat or a choked-up feeling? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Never Always 
18. When you are with the snake, does your stomach get upset? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not at all Very upset 
19. When you are with the snake,-do you get a sinking or 
heavy feeling in your stomach? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Never Always 
20. When you are with the snake, do you have any difficulty 
talking? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Never V Always 
21. When you are with the snake, are you bothered by your 
bodily reactions? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
Not bothered Bothered very 
at all much 
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INDIVIDUAL DATA SHEET 
SUBJECT GROUP 
Physiio., 
BAT FT HR Percep. 
Pre To Ch Pre Fo Ch Pre Fo Ch Pri Po Ch 
1. 
2 .  
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 .  
7. 
8 .  
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16.  
17. 
18. 
19. 
20 .  
21.  
SRIA 
Pre Fo Ch 
S Expectation - before , after , change^ 
APPENDIX H 
11? 
Subject Expectation Form 
Name 
Please estimate the likelihood that your treatment program 
will (has) considerably lessen(ed) your fear of snakes. 
1 2 3 4 5 
very little extremely likely 
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INSTRUCTIONS READ TO GROUP II 
The treatment design in which you are participating 
has been demonstrated to be an effective method of reducing 
a person's fear of snakes. As other volunteer subjects will 
not be receiving the same type of treatment as you are, I 
would appreciate your not discussing your particular treat­
ment with any one else in the experiment. 
This session is the first of four treatment sessions. 
During each session, you will be connected to a physiological 
monitoring devise and a recorder which will measure your 
heart rate to presentations of the snake. 
In addition, video pictures will be taken of you 
during the minute and a half that you will be interacting 
with the snake. After this first session, i.e., at the 
beginning of the second, third and fourth, I will ask that 
you observe yourself on a video monitor. At that time you 
will see yourself during the one and one half minute 
exposure to the snake. After reviewing the video tape of 
the previous sessions you will be connected to the heart 
rate recorders and video taped for the next scheduled 
session. 
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INSTRUCTIONS READ TO GROUP III 
The treatment design in which you are participating 
has been demonstrated to be an effective method of reducing 
a person's fear of snakes. As other volunteer subjects will 
not be receiving the same type of treatment as you are, I 
would appreciate your not discussing your particular treat­
ment with any one else in the experiment. 
This session is the first of four treatment sessions. 
During each session, you will be connected to a physiological 
monitoring device and a recorder which will measure your 
heart rate to presentations of the snake. 
After this first session, i.e., at the beginning of 
the second, third and fourth, I will ask that you observe 
another student on the video monitor. The student which 
you will observe was matched to you on the basis of almost 
identical responses on the pre-experimental tests, i.e., 
their reactions to the snake in what behavior they performed, 
the amount of fear reported, reactions on the questionnaire 
and the heart rate measure. You will observe this person 
most like yourself during the one and one half minute video 
exposure to the snake and will also hear their heart rate. 
After reviewing the audio-video tape of the previous 
sessions, you will be connected to the heart rate recorder 
and requested to view the snake once again. 
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INSTRUCTIONS READ TO GROUP IV 
The treatment design in which you are participating 
has been demonstrated to be an effective method of reducing 
a person's fear of snakes. As other volunteer subjects will 
not be receiving the same type of treatment as you are, I 
would appreciate your not discussing your particular treat­
ment with any one else in the experiment. 
This session is the first of four treatment sessions. 
During each session, you will be connected to a physiological 
monitoring device and a recorder which will measure your 
heart rate to presentations of the snake. 
After the first session, i.e., at the beginning of the 
second, third and fourth, I will ask that you observe another 
student on the video monitor. The student which you will 
observe was matched to you on the basis of almost identical 
responses on the pre-experimental tests, i.e., their 
reactions to the snake in what behaviors they performed, the 
amount of fear, reported, reactions on the questionnaire and 
the heart rate measure. You will observe this person most 
like yourself during the one and one half minute video 
exposure to the snake. After reviewing the video tape of 
previous sessions, you will be connected to the heart rate 
recorder and requested to view the snake once again. 
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INSTRUCTIONS READ TO GROUP V 
The treatment design in which you are participating 
has been demonstrated to be an effective method of reducing 
a person's fear of snakes. As other volunteer subjects will 
not be receiving the same type of treatment as you are, I 
would appreciate your not discussing your particular treat­
ment with any one else in the experiment. 
This session is the first of four treatment sessions. 
During each session, you will be connected to a physiological 
monitoring device and a recorder which will measure your 
heart rate to presentations of the snake. 
In addition the audio heart rate recording taken of 
you during the minute and a half that you will be interacting 
with the snake will be re-recorded on the video tape. After 
this first session, i.e., at the beginning of the second, 
third and fourth, I will ask that you observe the snake on 
the video monitor. At that time you will see the snake in 
the plexiglass cage for a one and one half minute exposure 
and will also hear your heart rate previously recorded. 
After reviewing the audio-video tape of the previous session* . 
you will be connected to the heart rate recorder and taped 
for the next scheduled session. 
\ 
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INSTRUCTIONS READ TO GROUP VI 
The treatment design in which you are participating 
has been demonstrated to be an effective method of reducing 
a person's fear of snakes. As other volunteer subjects will 
not be receiving the same type of treatment as you are, I 
would appreciate your not discussing your particular treat­
ment with any one else in the experiment. 
This session is the first of four treatment sessions. 
During each session, you will be connected to a physiological 
monitoring device and a recorder which will measure your 
heart rate to presentations of the snake. 
After this first session, i.e., at the beginning of 
the second, third and fourth, I will ask that you observe 
the snake on the video monitor. At that time you will see 
the snake in the plexiglass cage for a one and one half 
minute exposure which has been previously recorded. After 
reviewing the video tape of the previous sessions, you will 
be connected to the heart rate recorder and taped for the 
next scheduled session. 
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POSTEXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE CHECKING THE SUBJECT'S 
BELIEF IN THE EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS 
Please circle your answer. 
1. The person I saw on tape was 
A. myself 
B. my assigned model 
C. no one 
2. The sounds I heard on the tape were 
A. none 
B. extraneous noise 
C. heart beat 
3. The sounds I heard on tape were mady by 
A. mechanical device 
B. my model 
C. myself 
4. The person I saw (and heard) on tape demonstrated 
A. more fear than I 
B. less fear than I 
C. same as I 
D. does not apply 
5. I answered Question #4 based upon 
